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The proposition that a for-profit company can exist to benefit the public has 
been debated for decades.1  Online retailer Etsy famously embraced an ethos of 
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1. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY v (1932). 
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social responsibility until the pressures of being a publicly traded company 
proved too much.2  Thousands of other companies, however, go beyond 
embracing this ethos and explicitly organize themselves to promote a public 
benefit.3  As these companies navigate market pressures and try to balance profit 
with purpose, they will be sure to retain lawyers.  The question of what is 
ethically required of lawyers representing companies organized to create a 
public benefit has not confronted the bar for decades. 
Rules of professional responsibility are informed by substantive laws 
governing clients—in the case of corporate clients, by corporate law.  Corporate 
law gives attorneys an ethical framework when representing corporations and 
helps to interpret obligations in specific situations.  If corporate law is focused 
on elevating shareholder interests above all else, current ethical norms flow from 
that understanding.  And, if benefit corporations change that notion of 
shareholder primacy, challenges to attorneys’ ethical duties should follow. 
The benefit corporation is a relatively new corporate form that allows 
companies to opt into a legal framework in which they can pursue a public 
benefit alongside profit without running afoul of corporate law.4  Benefit 
corporations were created to appeal to founders who want to grow their 
businesses without losing their companies’ sense of mission and investors who 
seek out investments that will return some social, in addition to financial, return.5 
Benefit corporations exist somewhere between the traditional for-profit and 
charitable sectors.  The form seeks to create an option that combines the mission-
driven work typical of the charitable space and the flexibility and market-driven 
solutions of for-profit businesses.  Attorneys for for-profit corporations and 
nonprofit organizations operate under norms that developed in the shadow of the 
law governing their clients’ organizations.  If benefit corporations represent a 
hybrid of for-profit and nonprofit entities, legal ethics will need to embrace a 
hybrid framework as well.  The benefit corporation, therefore, poses a question 
that has not been asked by corporate lawyers in a long time—what does it mean 
to represent a for-profit entity that exists to promote the public interest? 
Lawyers for benefit corporations should integrate the spirit and purpose of the 
law into their ethical obligations, much as lawyers for other types of 
2. David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html. 
3. Ellen Berrey, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There?, SSRN (May 5, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602781 (finding 2,541 benefit corporations 
ever formed as of 2015); see also J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 541, 588–89 (2016) (noting 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations or benefit LLCs 
as of 2016); see generally Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days 
Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 259–75 (2014) (describing Delaware 
companies incorporating or converting to benefit corporations). 
4. Berrey, supra note 3. 
5. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 231, 263
(2013). 
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organizations already do.6  To do so in the context of benefit corporation 
legislation enables clients to serve the purpose for which their form was enacted 
and comports with our understanding of corporate law and transactional attorney 
ethics in light of this new corporate form.  In developing a framework for 
attorneys representing benefit corporations, prior rules and norms around 
corporate representation and frameworks for nonprofit and government lawyers 
are particularly instructive.  These attorneys should balance confidentiality 
obligations against their client’s legal purpose.  Further, lawyers for benefit 
corporations should advise their client first on the effect of their actions on the 
rights of third parties, rather than how to mitigate legal risk. 
Of particular concern to attorneys should be benefit corporation clients which 
fail to create, or even endeavor to create, a public benefit.  Companies that 
deceptively hold themselves out as being mission-driven are said to engage in 
greenwashing.7  Greenwashers profit off the promise to conduct business in a 
way that benefits the environment, create good jobs in struggling neighborhoods, 
or redirect a portion of profits or goods or services to those unable to afford 
them, without actually doing so.8  The benefit corporation form may be attractive 
to would-be greenwashers.  By incorporating as a benefit corporation, nefarious 
businesses can pursue investors, customers, and general goodwill by falsely 
purporting to pursue a mission.  Other benefit corporations may simply fail to 
operate in a way that benefits nonshareholder stakeholders or to consider the 
breadth of the effects of corporate action.  Either of these situations may violate 
benefit corporation legislation and lead to difficult questions for attorneys.  What 
are the attorney’s obligations when she has a greenwashing client?  How broadly 
does the attorney define her client?  What is the scope of advice that the attorney 
should give? 
The profession is sure to face these questions.  Businesses are increasingly 
opting into this form.9  Household names like Patagonia10 and Kickstarter11 are 
benefit corporations, and the largest benefit corporation to go public held its 
initial public offering in February 2017.12  Concerningly, however, at least one 
6. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of 
the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1471 (2006). 
7. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public
Benefit Corporations, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 528 (2017). 
8. See id. at 558. 
9. Murray, supra note 3, at 588–89 (finding 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations
or benefit LLCs as of 2016); Plerhoples, supra note 3, at 259–75 (analyzing Delaware benefit 
corporations); Berrey, supra note 3 (finding 2,541 benefit corporations as of 2015). 
10. B-Lab & Patagonia – the first California Certified B Corporation, PATAGONIA,
http://www.patagonia.com/b-lab.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
11. Yancey Stricker et al., Kickstarter is now a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER (Sept. 21,
2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-benefit-corporation. 
12. Lauren Gensler, The World’s Biggest For-Profit College Company, Laureate Education,
Raises $490 Million In Public Debut, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/02/01/laureate-education-initial-public-offering/. 
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benefit corporation has come under fire for promising, but ultimately failing to 
balance the interests of its shareholders and other stakeholders.  Rasmussen 
College, a Delaware public benefit corporation, was the subject of a 2014 report 
by the U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee finding 
that it, along with others, failed to provide effective, affordable education to its 
students despite committing to do so in its corporate charter.13 
This Article explores the professional and ethical responsibilities of lawyers 
representing benefit corporations, which have not previously been analyzed.  
The benefit corporation as proposed or enacted across a number of states is 
accepted and the Article looks at how attorneys can meet these responsibilities. 
Part I examines in detail the connection between corporate law theory and 
legal ethics.  The rules of professional responsibility do not stand alone and are 
not comprehensive enough to guide attorneys through every imaginable 
situation; rather, they are dependent on and derive in part from other areas of 
substantive law.  In order to ethically represent an organizational client, the 
attorney must show fidelity to that client’s organizational structure—its 
decision-making rules, its fiduciary duties, and its property norms.14  Attorneys 
must look to synthesize rules of professional conduct, corporate fiduciary law, 
and the potential of civil liability for malpractice.15  The changes found in the 
benefit corporation legislation require a new ethical framework for attorneys 
representing these organizations.  In describing that framework, I draw from 
ethical rules for attorneys representing charities, government lawyering, and 
prior eras of legal ethics. 
Part II looks at several specific ethical rules and situations to demonstrate the 
extent to which ethical obligations reflect corporate law as private law generally 
and shareholder primacy specifically.  Who is the client?  To whom does client 
confidentiality extend?  What reporting duties does the attorney have in the event 
of a breach of fiduciary duty?  What is the scope of advice that lawyers are 
required to give clients?  Might an attorney be liable if her corporate client 
engages in greenwashing? 
Part III describes benefit corporation legislation.  To understand how benefit 
corporations affect attorneys’ ethical duties, it is important to understand which 
features of traditional corporations they sought to change.  Benefit corporations 
were created as a response to both shareholder primacy specifically and private 
law generally.  In previous decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR),16 
13. Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 560–62. 
14. William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 494
(2016). 
15. George Rutherglen, Lawyer for the Organization: An Essay on Legal Ethics, 1 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 141, 151–55 (2006). 
16. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351–53 (2011). 
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progressive corporate law,17 and social enterprise movements18 emerged that 
attempted to move corporate law, or at least corporate management practices, 
toward recognition of the effects of corporate behavior on society at large.  
Social enterprise boosters believed that traditional corporate forms were not 
suited to the task of social enterprise and that new corporate forms were required 
to accommodate purpose and profit.19  The benefit corporation arose out of this 
movement.  This section examines advocacy and legislative history around the 
adoption of benefit corporation legislation and finds a narrow focus on 
shareholder interests as a key complaint of the form’s boosters. 
Part IV reassesses ethical issues in light of benefit corporation legislation to 
show how, based on current understanding, attorneys’ ethical obligations will 
differ when representing benefit corporations.  This section focuses particularly 
on attorney reporting duties in the case of clients engaged in greenwashing.  
Benefit corporation legislation necessitates a return to an ethical paradigm 
similar to that of the eighteenth-century public citizen.  Also drawn upon is the 
law governing government lawyers, who as a general rule are to represent the 
public interest.20 
Finally, Part V recommends specific changes, including reporting duties for 
attorneys who become aware that their clients are engaging in behavior that fails 
to promote a public benefit, where rules can be brought in line with the 
framework described.  These changes would not only clarify lawyers’ ethical 
duties to these clients and the public they seek to benefit; they would also 
deputize attorneys in the effort to create a public good through these entities and 
guard against greenwashing.21  Also addressed are concerns that a modified view 
of legal ethics would dissuade entrepreneurs from forming benefit corporations 
out of fear of being reported by their attorney. 
17. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii–xv (1995). 
18. See Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1353 (“‘Social enterprise’ is a loose term for
businesses that aim to generate profits while advancing social goals.”); see also Patience A. 
Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective Impact 
Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 631 (2016) (“[S]ocial enterprises are businesses that make profits 
both for the benefit of the owners’ compensation as well as the advancement of a specific social 
purpose or mission.”); Plerhoples, supra note 5, at 225 (citations omitted) (“According to Social 
Enterprise Alliance, Inc., a non-profit organization that promotes the goals of social enterprise, a 
social enterprise must ‘directly address an intractable social need and serve[ ] the common good, 
either through its products and services or through the number of disadvantaged people it employs.’  
For others, social enterprise means ‘blended enterprise’ or double or triple bottom line businesses—
i.e., ‘entit[ies] that intend[ ] to pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by making
considered choices to pursue one over the other.’”). 
19. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1353. 
20. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will 
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 794–96 (2000). 
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act was similarly passed to respond to a wave of large corporate scandals
around the turn of the twenty-first century, the most prominent of which was the Enron scandal. 
Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. 
REV. 725, 727–28 (2004). 
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I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW GOVERNING CLIENT ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LAWYERS ETHICAL DUTIES 
In the case of organizational representation, the law governing client 
organizations affects lawyers’ ethical obligations when representing those 
organizations.  The rules of professional responsibility do not stand alone and 
are not comprehensive enough to guide attorneys through every imaginable 
situation; rather, they are dependent on and derive in part from other areas of 
substantive law.22  Ethical duties arise from rules of professional conduct 
adopted by jurisdictions23 and bar opinions interpreting those rules,24 other 
regulations that apply to attorneys practicing before various regulatory 
agencies,25 as well as the law of attorney malpractice.26  As a result, ethical 
obligations may vary depending on the identity of a client organization.  
Lawyers for traditional for-profit corporations and nonprofit organizations, for 
example, should approach lawyering differently, taking into account rules 
governing the client organization’s structure and purpose. 
                                               
 22. When interpreting specific rules of professional conduct, “[t]he law governing the 
organization largely determines the ethical obligations of the attorney who represents the 
organization.”  Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 154. 
 23. I will mostly discuss the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which were 
drafted by the American Bar Association and served as a model for rules of professional conduct 
in thirty-seven states.  See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
Comments, ABA (June 15, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/adoption_mrpc_comments.authcheckdam.pdf.  Of course, language 
and interpretations of rules of professional conduct vary by state and those changes may very well 
have an impact on the questions posed in this section for attorneys representing traditional 
corporations and for those advising benefit corporations.  See id. 
 24. See, e.g., Ethics Opinions, ABA (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ethics_opinions/. 
 25. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning of the 
Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395, 395, 398 (1993). 
 26. Written rules of professional conduct and malpractice claims are related, but the two do 
not overlap completely.  The Model Rules state that: 
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor 
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached . . . . 
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability . . . . Nevertheless, since the Rules 
do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be 
evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).  It is, therefore, 
possible that conduct that violates rules of professional conduct does not rise to the level of 
malpractice.  Likewise, attorneys could be liable for criminal or tortious behavior under theories 
not based on a violation of the rules of professional conduct.  See Hazard, Jr., supra note 25, at 
399–400; see also Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 149 (“Model Rule 1.13(a) thus does not tell a 
corporate lawyer who is authorized to act on behalf of a corporation or what the extent of his 
authority is.  By the same token, the law governing the organization does not directly address the 
obligations of its attorney, leaving those issues to be addressed by the Model Rules or perhaps the 
law of malpractice.  The cross-references between each of these sources of law leave both of them 
with a troubling indeterminacy.  Neither one appears to be the fixed point from which the other’s 
content can be filled out.”). 
2019] Who is the Client? 297 
Deciphering professional responsibility obligations when representing an 
organization requires first that the attorney identify her client.  In the case of 
organizational representation, the client is the organization itself.27  Model Rule 
1.13(a) provides that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization 
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”28  
Defining the client as the organization is ultimately a fiction, however, as the 
attorney will necessarily interface with and take direction from individuals 
within the corporation.29  For that reason, the Model Rules recognize that 
attorneys represent organizations through their “duly authorized constituents.”30  
The rules lack guidance on identifying an organization’s “duly authorized 
constituents”; since substantive law dictates who is authorized to act on behalf 
of an organization, it is necessary to look to substantive law to understand who 
those “duly authorized constituents” are.31 
Defining the constituents through which a client may act is key for any lawyer 
representing an organization.  One author wrote: 
To responsibly represent a client, a lawyer needs the ability to answer 
three questions: Who speaks for the client, and can thus instruct the 
lawyer?  Who listens for the client, and thus should receive the 
information the lawyer is obliged to communicate?  Who acts for the 
client, and can thus take the actions needed to make commitments on 
behalf of the client?32 
Once she has answered those questions, the lawyer can begin to understand 
what standard of care she owes and to whom, as well as available courses of 
action when the attorney knows or believes that management is engaging in 
improper behavior.33 
                                               
 27. See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 155 (“[E]veryone knows that Model Rule 1.13(a) 
requires corporate counsel to represent the organization, not the individuals within it; yet no one 
knows precisely what that requires corporate counsel to do.”). 
 28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  “As applied 
specifically to Model Rule 1.13(a), no purely moral principle requires a lawyer for an organization 
always to act as instructed by ‘its duly authorized constituents.’  Ethics in this sense requires 
lawyers to look beyond the law governing the organization and beyond legal ethics itself.”  See 
Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 145. 
 29. Ralph Jonas, Who is the Client: The Corporate Lawyer’s Dilemma., 39 HASTINGS L.J. 
617, 617 (1988). 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 31. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 153–54 (“[Rules] governing representation of an 
organization, dependent as they are on the interrelated fiduciary obligations of directors, officers, 
and agents, are more complicated than most ethical rules.  Instead of denying the judgment 
necessary to take account of such complexity, it would be better to use it to frame the analysis of 
the attorney’s obligations.”); see also Simon, supra note 14, at 493.  As written, Model Rule 1.13 
applies in all cases of organizational representation.  Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 148. 
 32. Simon, supra note 14, at 492. 
 33. “In order to act ethically, the lawyer must instead determine what the interests of the 
organization and its constituents legitimately are and how they legitimately may be pursued.” 
Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 148. 
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The attorney must also understand her client organization’s legal purpose; if 
a client constituent acts contrary to the organization’s legal purpose, that person 
ceases to be a duly authorized constituent of the organization.34  William Simon 
has coined the term “Framework of Dealing” to describe this understanding of 
client identity.35  Under the “Framework of Dealing,” the lawyer owes an 
obligation to the legal framework in which her client corporation operates, 
including the organization’s legal purpose.36  Lawyers also have certain ethical 
obligations when a client constituent is acting contrary to that legal purpose.37 
Attorneys’ duties are further constrained by common law rules of malpractice.  
Attorneys who fail to satisfy their obligations may find themselves liable to both 
their clients and to third parties.38  The standards under which attorneys may be 
held liable for malpractice depend on ethical rules39 as well as statutes.40  
Changes in substantive law that affect the duties of client constituents will 
inevitably require attorneys to take those changes into account and adequately 
advise their clients.  Lawyers must stay apprised of legal developments around, 
for example, corporate officers’ duties in order to provide competent counsel. 
Attorneys must, therefore, look to synthesize rules of professional conduct, 
substantive law, and the potential of civil liability for malpractice.41  This may 
not be an easy task.  The legal structure, governing law, and the matter at hand 
may all determine who constitutes the client corporation’s “duly authorized 
constituents.”  Key to this analysis is an understanding of the client’s legal 
purpose.  The following sections discuss the legal purposes of corporations, 
nonprofit organizations, and government agencies.  They also describe the ways 
in which these legal purposes affect lawyers’ professional responsibility 
obligations.  Understanding the ways in which benefit corporation legislation 
departs from or is similar to legal purposes in other settings will help interpret 
how to lawyer to the benefit corporation.  This Section examines the connection 
between substantive law and legal ethics in three contexts: lawyers representing 
corporate clients, lawyers for nonprofit organizations, and government lawyers.  
Section II below attempts to apply these principles to ethical rules around 
                                               
 34. William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An 
Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 80–81 (2003). 
 35. Id. at 86–103. 
 36. Id. at 86–87. 
 37. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 164. 
 38. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 25, at 400. 
 39. Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice: Do 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 46 (1998) 
(“[E]xamination of judicial decisions in a number of areas confirms that courts regularly cite ethical 
rules to support propositions that augment or modify the civil law.”). 
 40. Id. at 69 (“The widely accepted test for applying statutory standards to civil actions is 
whether the legislature intended to protect the class of persons of whom the plaintiff is a member 
from the type of harm that occurred.”). 
 41. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 151–55. 
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confidentiality and reporting, the scope of advice that attorneys give their clients, 
and the extent to which attorneys can be held liable to third parties. 
A.  The Traditional Model of Corporation Representation 
In the case of corporate representation, the attorney must grasp both the legal 
nature of her client and the law governing her client in order to understand her 
duties to that client. Corporate law’s implications on ethical duties can be broken 
down into three categories: 
There are decision rules that allocate presumptive responsibility and 
specify procedures.  There are fiduciary duties that require that 
decision-making responsibility be exercised in the interests of the 
organization, rather than in the individual interests of the decision-
makers.  And, there are property norms that distinguish the 
organization’s assets from the personal assets of the constituents and 
delineate the relative claims on organizational assets by constituents.  
The fiduciary norms qualify the decision rules, making authority 
conditional on its exercise in the interest of the organization.  The 
property norms give definition to fiduciary duties, indicating which 
constituent interests should be deemed interests of the organization.42 
When representing a corporation, the attorney’s client is the corporation itself 
and not any individual officer, director, employee, or shareholder constituent.43  
The attorney does not consider merely the group of decision-makers as her client 
but refers to the rules around the authority structure and purpose of the 
corporation to interpret her ethical obligations.  Decision, fiduciary, and property 
rules and duties constitute corporate purpose, and a violation of any also 
constitutes a violation of corporate purpose.  Following the dictates of corporate 
law, the attorney must act in a way that is reasonable with respect to other 
corporate constituents’ interests, including those of shareholders, rather than 
simply deferring to the direction of management.44 
This generally accepted model of corporate representation reflects an 
understanding of corporate law as a private ordering mechanism that serves to 
protect the interests of shareholders above all else, but the legal purpose of the 
corporation is and has been the subject of great deliberation.45  Much of the 
debate over the proper role of corporate law is a debate over who has a legal 
right to call herself a constituent or a stakeholder of the corporation.46  This 
contrast is between the view that “corporate activity has broad social and 
political ramifications that justify a body of corporate law that is deliberately 
                                               
 42. Simon, supra note 14, at 493. 
 43. Jonas, supra note 29, at 617. 
 44. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 148. 
 45. Martin Lipton et al., The Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/11/the-
purpose-of-the-corporation/. 
 46. See Ved P. Nanda et al., 1 TRANSACTIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.7 (2018). 
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responsive to public interest concerns” and the view that corporate law governs 
“little more than the private relations between the shareholders of the 
corporation and management, which acts as their agents or trustees.”47  On one 
end of the spectrum, the corporation’s owners are its only true constituents and 
it is their interest and no one else’s that dictates the corporation’s goals.48  On 
the other, the corporation’s stakeholders extend to a broad constituency, up to 
and including the public at large.49 
Ascertaining who falls within the corporation’s constituency determines to 
whom a corporate constituent owes a duty.  The next step is to ask what duty, 
exactly, is owed.  In the narrowest formulation of corporate duties, officers and 
directors owe a duty to the shareholders alone.50  Those duties are generally 
defined as fiduciary duties—namely, the duties of care and loyalty—which are 
enforceable by shareholders.51  If the corporation owes a duty to a wider group 
of constituents than merely its shareholders, the definition of that duty gets 
muddled.  The corporation is capable of creating financial benefits beyond profit 
to shareholders, such as jobs or savings for consumers, and is even able to drive 
non-financial outcomes, like environmental effects.  Of course, the corporation 
is capable of doing harm as well.  Does this mean that corporate directors and 
officers owe duties to, for example, employees and customers? 
This debate could also be described as a contrast between a view of 
corporations as private property and a conception of corporations as public 
social institutions.52  Under the property conception, the corporation is solely the 
property of its shareholders, and to spend that property on something other than 
                                               
 47. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201–02 (1990) (calling 
this dichotomy “abidingly crucial”). 
 48. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 
26 (1991). 
 49. See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); see Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (finding that the court will not question the 
business judgment of directors who must consider the public and shareholders in determining the 
long-term interests of a corporation); Linda Kawaguchi, Introduction to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.: 
Primary Source and Commentary Material, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 493, 493–96 (2014) (discussing 
Dodge through an analysis of the court transcripts). 
 50. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.  This is often, though not always, defined as maximizing 
profit to shareholders.  Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 535 (“Delaware courts espouse the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm as the central purpose of a corporation.”); William H. Clark, Jr. & 
Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business 
Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 (2012) (“[A] business corporation has as its 
purpose creating financial gain for its shareholders . . . .”). 
 51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); Annotation, 
In General, West’s ALR Digest Corporations and Business Organizations k1841 (2018). 
 52. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992). 
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shareholder benefit is morally and normatively wrong.53  It follows that the 
creation of wealth should always be the corporation’s objective and that 
corporate law should not pay attention to who benefits from corporate action 
aside from shareholders.54  This property concept is private ordering in its 
narrowest form: corporate law exists to regulate the relationship between the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Under the social institution conception, on the 
other hand, the corporation must strive to satisfy consumers, provide 
employment, and contribute to “public life of its communities.”55  
Management’s job, therefore, is to balance these competing interests.56  This 
view hints at a public ordering regime: management discretion is necessary to 
monitor the corporation’s effect on the public and other stakeholders and 
mitigate negative outcomes as they see fit.57 
The public versus private nature of corporate law is vital under the 
“Framework of Dealing.”  The more constrained the corporate duties are, the 
more the attorney’s obligations are themselves circumscribed.  Corporate law 
has, by and large, embraced shareholder primacy, thereby requiring that 
directors prioritize the interests of shareholders above all else.58  Corporate law 
gives those directors wide latitude when deciding how to do so.59  Attorneys are 
also to give their clients latitude, mostly deferring to the wishes of corporate 
fiduciaries absent evidence of clear harm to the shareholders.  Fiduciary laws, 
however, do place limitations on management’s ability to act on the legal 
positions that attorneys can take.60  Though attorneys do not take instruction 
from shareholders, and although attorneys are not in an attorney-client 
relationship with shareholders, “[t]he attorney must act reasonably to protect the 
interests of shareholders or other constituents of the organization to whom 
management owes fiduciary obligations.”61 
We can imagine two public corporations, both incorporated in states that 
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which demonstrate these 
                                               
 53. Id. at 267–69. 
 54. Id. at  264–65.  Allen does concede that, in the property conception, a government may 
have a role to play in addressing issues of wealth distribution and external social cost through 
taxation and regulation, although such powers should apparently be applied ex-post rather than ex-
ante to any corporate action.  Id. at 269–70. 
 55. Id. at 271. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 272.  Proponents of both views argue that their view is not ultimately about public 
versus private benefit but rather two views of how to best maximize value to the shareholders and 
over what timeline; the property view correctly focuses on taking advantage of short-term 
opportunities, while the entity view ensures that shareholders can extract profit from an enterprise 
over a longer amount of time.  Id. 
 58. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998). 
 59. Charles Hanson, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and the American Law 
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355, 1356 (1993). 
 60. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 151–55. 
 61. Id. at 153. 
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frameworks.  Red Corp. is a traditional corporation that operates under a 
shareholder primacy regime.  Green Corp. is a corporation that has opted out of 
this regime and explicitly exists to create a general public benefit and with a 
stated specific public purpose of “conducting operations in a manner causing no 
unnecessary harm by continually seeking to reduce the environmental footprint” 
while creating jobs in local, underserved communities.62  It has designated both 
a specific director and officer to oversee the creation and reporting of those 
benefits.  Both produce widgets and have similar customer, vendor, and 
employee bases. 
The framework under which attorneys for Red Corp. operate is well 
understood.  Attorneys for corporations are zealous advocates63 for the 
corporation’s interests, which is defined largely (though not entirely) by the 
interests of its shareholders.  The attorney’s duties are explicitly grounded in 
corporate law as private ordering.  “[C]orporations . . . are only formal 
arrangements of real persons pursuing their real interests” and are therefore 
deserving of exercising their autonomy as much as individuals who “pursued 
their interests in simple arrangements and associations[.]”64  The corporate 
client’s interest in exercising autonomy as a group of persons, therefore, trumps 
any larger societal obligation the corporate may have, and lawyers do “justice” 
by furthering that exercise of autonomy. 
The upshot of corporate law for lawyers is the duty to guard against risk that 
could harm the corporation (and therefore harm the value of the shareholders’ 
investment).65  Among a lawyer’s most important and valuable roles, 
particularly in a transactional context, is identifying and counseling clients on 
legal risk.  Legal risk refers to the risk of legal liability and is distinct from 
reputational, relational, or other business risk to the client; though lawyers often 
advise clients on these matters as well.66   Few lawyers view their obligations as 
                                               
 62. This language is modeled in part on the language of Patagonia, a California private benefit 
corporation.  This is part of Patagonia’s specific public benefit.  Annual Benefit Corporation 
Report, PATAGONIA WORKS 8 (2016), http://www.societabenefit.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Patagonia-2016.pdf. 
 63. Lawyers need to be zealous advocates for their clients while also seeking to advise and 
understand their clients.  William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty 
of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004). 
 64. Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1076 (1976).  Fried acknowledged that the analysis of who the 
client is, what that client’s interests are, to whom the lawyer owes loyalty, and the substance of that 
loyalty in the case of a corporate client are complex questions deserving of “complicated though 
wholly coherent” analysis.  Id. 
 65. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) 
(requiring a lawyer to report up the chain of command and giving them discretion to report outside 
the corporation any actions which are “likely to result in substantial injury to the organization”). 
 66. See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory 
State: Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 
2002 (2016) (providing a discussion of how attorneys evaluate and advise clients on business risk 
related to international human rights issues). 
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extending to protecting against harm to non-shareholder third parties absent the 
identification of some legal or business risk to the client corporation.  Indeed, 
many corporate lawyers believe that the law requires only compliance with the 
literal letter of the law and that attorneys, therefore, should advise their clients 
on meeting the law’s minimum standards only.67  The view is not constrained 
by the public interest if the public interest is not explicitly stated in the law.68 
This articulation of client identity reflects what I have previously defined as 
the Unary and Multiary Models.69  “In the Unary Model, both corporate 
fiduciaries and attorneys work for a singular purpose.”70  Corporate fiduciaries’ 
“sole concern is that of the corporation’s shareholders, and the lawyer’s sole 
concern is that of her client.”71  The opposite of the Unary Model is the Multiary 
Model, in which “corporate fiduciaries must concern themselves with a wide 
range of stakeholders . . .” and the attorney owes duties beyond those that she 
owes her client.72  So, while Red Corp.’s attorneys guard against legal and other 
risk, Green Corp.’s attorneys’ duties are broader and more amorphous. 
Corporate law is key to understanding both attorneys’ obligations.  In the case 
of conflict among members of Red Corp.’s control group, for example, the 
lawyer is to follow the rules governing the relative authority of constituents to 
know to whom she should defer.73  And, should the highest authority within the 
client corporation insist on acting in a way that is counter to the purpose of the 
corporation—the promotion of shareholder interests—the attorney should resign 
the representation.74  The shareholders themselves may fall within the 
corporation’s “duly authorized constituents”75 if the client’s governing 
documents or governing law require that the shareholders approve a particular 
matter, particularly in closely held corporations.  Corporate law, the client 
corporation’s governing documents, and the nature of the client corporation all 
determine a corporation’s attorney’s course of action. 
                                               
 67. Simon, supra note 6, at 1455–57. 
 68. See also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, 
and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 626 (1986). 
The client’s autonomy should be limited by the law, not by the lawyer’s morality. And if 
“the law” is manipulable and without clear limits on client conduct, that aspect of the law 
should be available to the client.  If moral limits are not provided by the law and are not 
imposed by the lawyer, their source will be where it ought to be: the client. 
Id. 
 69. See Joseph Pileri, Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics and the Benefit Corporation, 8 ST. 
MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 180, 183–86 (2017). 
 70. Id. at 183. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 186. 
 73. See Simon, supra note 34, at 75–77. 
 74. Id. at 80. 
 75. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of Client Identity in the Context of 
Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV. 181, 211–12 (2004). 
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In the case of both Green Corp. and Red Corp., the lawyer will define the 
client as the organization.  Though the identity of the client will not differ 
between the two, corporate law will affect who speaks for each corporation and 
set the bounds of the attorney’s role.  This leads to certain obligations that arise 
in the event that the client is ignoring or subverting its chosen purpose.  The 
outcome of the obligation to protect these constituents’ interests is explored in 
several specific situations below. 
B.  Nonprofit Lawyers 
Attorneys have a unique set of obligations when representing nonprofit and 
charitable organizations.  Rather than promoting the interests of shareholders, 
nonprofit charities exist to further a charitable purpose.76  Nonprofit directors 
owe a duty of obedience to carry out the organization’s stated mission.77  Unlike 
corporations, nonprofit organizations are not accountable to their beneficiaries; 
the state rather than the beneficiaries plays the central role in ensuring that these 
organizations are complying with their stated purpose.78  The duty of obedience 
exists to supplement the duties of care and loyalty and to hold charitable 
directors to their organizational purpose.79 
The duty of obedience informs the nonprofit attorney’s obligations much in 
the way fiduciary duties inform the corporate attorney’s work.  The nonprofit 
attorney must take the mission of her client as defined by the organization’s 
governing documents into account when defining her duties.80  The attorney’s 
commitment to their nonprofit clients requires that she work on behalf of that 
mission.81  She must also be mindful that the nonprofit organization has no 
owners and that its beneficiaries have no direct role in monitoring the 
organization’s activities.  Because this role is delegated to the state and federal 
governments, the nonprofit attorney must advise her client in the context of those 
regulatory schemes.82  The government defines how the organization may 
further its purpose and the risk for failing to do so, both of which factor into the 
attorney’s obligations. 
                                               
 76. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 77. David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(C)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 38 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 660 (2012).  But see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE 
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 305 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018) (allowing directors to 
amend governing documents and mission statement from time to time). 
 78. Simon, supra note 34, at 112–13. 
 79. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-
Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2007). 
 80. Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
267, 334–35 (2017); Walker, supra note 77, at 660. 
 81. Walker, supra note 77, at 660. 
 82. See Simon, supra note 34, at 112–13. 
2019] Who is the Client? 305 
C.  Government Lawyers 
Lawyers for the government similarly draw from the legal framework in 
which their clients operate.  Government lawyers not only have clients who 
serve the public interest, but these attorneys are to represent the public interest 
themselves.83  The role that government attorneys play has often been described 
as that of “gatekeeper”: attorneys use their position “to halt malfeasance by 
decisionmakers and prevent harm to . . . third parties”84 and promote the public 
interest.85  As gatekeepers, government lawyers should recognize that they have 
a higher obligation than their colleagues to represent the public interest.86  
Government attorneys, therefore, balance their obligations to their clients 
against this mandate to not cause harm to the public. 
Defining the client’s identity is a difficult task for the government lawyer.  
The government lawyer is usually employed by and reports to individuals within 
executive agencies, who are under the ultimate control of the executive, but 
tasked with executing laws passed by the legislature, all of whom are ultimately 
accountable to the public.  The Federal Bar Association has held that the 
particular agency that employs the attorney is the proper articulation of client 
identity.87  However, government lawyers are also said to represent the public 
interest.88  The attorney must, therefore, keep in mind the larger structures of 
government, including checks and balances among the branches and the 
agency’s role within that structure.89  This requires that the government attorney 
carry out her work “in a manner that is not clearly inconsistent with lawful 
requirements[,]” a duty that goes above and beyond those of private attorneys.90 
Government lawyers face certain obstacles when deciphering their ethical 
duties—namely, that ethical rules are designed primarily for litigators in the 
private bar91 and that the definition of “the public interest” is difficult to define.92  
These attorneys must “identify the public interest in regard to the particular legal 
problems faced by them in their work as government attorneys.”93 
                                               
 83. See Berenson, supra note 20, at 789. 
 84. Note, Government Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2008). 
 85. Id. at 1412. 
 86. See Berenson, supra note 20, at 794. 
 87. Honorable Charles Fahy, The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 
FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973). 
 88. See Berenson, supra note 20, at 789. 
 89. Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1056–62 (2007). 
 90. Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the Government Lawyer?, in  ETHICAL 
STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 28 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 91. Clark, supra note 89, at 1038. 
 92. Berenson, supra note 20, at 814. 
 93. Id. 
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II. INTERPRETATIONS OF SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS REFLECT LAW GOVERNING 
CLIENT ORGANIZATIONS 
As a result of the interplay between substantive law and legal ethics, attorneys 
may have different professional responsibility obligations depending on the 
identity of their client. Substantive law can aid attorneys in answering the 
following questions: How strong or weak are confidentiality obligations?  Are 
there situations in which an attorney can or may report client activity without 
violating confidentiality, and to whom?  What is the scope of advice that the 
attorney is required to give?  Might the attorney be liable to nonclient third 
parties for client activity?  The following sections attempt to answer those 
questions for attorneys representing corporations, nonprofit organizations, and 
government agencies; later sections draw on that analysis to interpret attorneys’ 
obligations when representing benefit corporations. 
A.  Confidentiality and Reporting 
Chief among any lawyer’s obligations is the duty to retain client 
confidentialities.94  Model Rule 1.6 states that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by [this rule].”95  Although all 
attorneys are bound by confidentiality, attorneys balance their confidentiality 
obligations against the law governing their client organization.  As a result, 
confidentiality protections may be stronger or weaker depending on the identity 
of the client. 
In the organizational context, any information the attorney receives will come 
from individuals; it is, therefore, important that both the attorney and the person 
divulging information understand when those communications are confidential 
and with whom information relayed can be shared.  Those within the client’s 
“circle of confidentiality” may share confidential information with the 
corporation’s attorney themselves, for example, without entering into an 
attorney-client relationship, and an attorney is then free to share that information 
within that circle.96 
Confidentiality concerns are of particular interest for attorneys who identify 
constituents acting unlawfully or in a way that violates the organization’s legal 
purpose.  If a corporate client’s purpose is defined as furthering the interests of 
its shareholders, it is necessary to ask what obligations an attorney has if she 
                                               
 94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should 
Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 874–76 (1998).  Over time, the circle of confidentiality has 
expanded from communications made under conditions of secrecy to “anyone within the corporate 
structure whose duties related to the issues upon which the attorney was asked to render legal 
assistance.”  Id. 
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knows or believes that one of her client’s officers or directors is violating one of 
their duties to the client’s shareholders.  Model Rule 1.13 generally provides 
procedures for an attorney who: 
knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the 
organization is engaged in action . . . that is a violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably 
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization.97 
The lawyer first shall refer the matter to the highest authority in the 
organization “[u]nless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in 
the best interest of the organization to do so[.]”98  If that authority fails to act, in 
certain circumstances, the lawyer may reveal the information to a third party 
even though such revelation would otherwise violate the prohibition against 
disclosing confidential information.99 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),100 passed in the wake of the Enron 
scandal, adds additional reporting requirements for attorneys that come under 
the SEC’s jurisdiction (generally, those representing publicly traded 
companies).101  SOX rules add to, rather than preempt, state ethical duties.102  
SOX places two requirements on attorneys who identify certain material 
violations: (1) disclosing confidential information regarding material violations 
of law to persons of authority within the client corporation (reporting up); and 
(2) disclosing such information outside the corporation under certain 
circumstances (reporting out).103  The rules promulgated under SOX first require 
that attorneys who “become[] aware of evidence of a material violation by the 
                                               
 97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 98. Id. 
Rule 1.13 . . . despite its mandatory language, contains a number of important limitations 
and qualifications (or should we say loopholes) that give lawyers wide discretion, making 
enforcement difficult.  These include: (1) the actual knowledge standard as the trigger 
for the lawyer’s duty; (2) a definitive “violation” rather than evidence of a violation or a 
potential violation; (3) the requirement that the violation be “related to the 
representation;” (4) the requirement that the violation “is likely to result in substantial 
injury” rather than simply being “material;” (5) the requirement that the substantial injury 
be “to the organization,” ignoring the situations in which only third persons are harmed 
by the illegality; (6) the exception to the reporting up duty if the lawyer “reasonably 
believes that it is not necessary in the best interests of the organization to do so;” and (7) 
the limitation that lawyers need to report to the “highest authority” only “if warranted by 
the seriousness of the matter.” 
Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 739 (citations omitted). 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codifed as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 101. See generally Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 727–28, 740–51 (discussing when an 
attorney is “‘appearing and practicing’ before the SEC”). 
 102. See id. at 788–92. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). 
308 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 68:291 
issuer . . . report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer (or the 
equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief 
executive officer.”104  Should the attorney “reasonably believe[] that the chief 
legal officer . . . has [not] provided an appropriate response within a reasonable 
time, the attorney shall report the evidence of a material violation to” the client’s 
board’s audit committee, another appropriate committee, or the board of 
directors itself.105  These constitute the attorney’s reporting up duties.  The 
attorney may also reveal evidence of material violations to the SEC without the 
client’s permission should the attorney reasonably believe it necessary to prevent 
the client from committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial 
injury to the financial interest or property of the client or investors, or to rectify 
the consequences of such a material violation.106  These constitute the attorney’s 
optional reporting out procedures. 
In order to satisfy their ethical obligations in the event of a breach of a duty to 
a shareholder, attorneys must understand whether fiduciary violations fall within 
the definition of activities that trigger obligations under either the Model Rules 
or SOX.  But, before getting to that question, the attorney must first make a 
determination that there is a breach at all.  Identifying a breach of fiduciary duty 
is difficult.  It is accepted that the attorney’s presumption of deference to 
corporate management is overcome when the manager is engaging in activity 
that either is illegal or threatens the corporation with serious harm.107  However, 
the business judgment rule provides directors with a significant safe harbor when 
making corporate decisions.108  Absent clear ethical guidelines, the lawyer’s 
judgment determines whether breaches of fiduciary do or should trump 
confidentiality.109 
The Model Rules provide no such guidelines.  Under Model Rule 1.13, the 
attorney must know of a violation before she has the discretion to report.110  She 
must be certain that the behavior in question is a violation of fiduciary duties 
before bringing that behavior to the board or other appropriate person.111  The 
attorney should feel confident that a claim based on these actions will overcome 
the business judgment rule—a very difficult standard.112  This is perhaps 
imaginable in a Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. situation 
                                               
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2018). 
 105. Id. § 205.3(b)(3).  Alternatively, the lawyer may report this evidence to a qualified legal 
compliance committee should the client corporation have created such a committee.  Id. § 205.3(c). 
 106. Id. § 205.3(d).  The attorney may also report evidence of a material violation to the SEC 
to prevent the client from committing perjury or other fraud.  Id. 
 107. Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2021–29. 
 108. See Hanson, supra note 59, at 1356. 
 109. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 439, 453–54 (2005). 
 110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Hanson, supra note 59, at 1356. 
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in which the board is preparing to reject the highest offer in a competitive bid 
for the sale of the company.113  Outside of Revlon, however, instances in which 
an attorney is positive that a fiduciary duty is being breached may be rare.114 
Assuming that the attorney is confident that a breach of fiduciary duty is 
occurring, she then must determine whether such a breach constitutes “a 
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization[.]”115  Courts and scholars who have 
considered this question have mostly found that a breach of fiduciary duty is not 
a violation of law, though this is far from settled.  In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green, a majority shareholder forced the buyout of minority shareholders for a 
price that the minority felt was far below market value.116  Minority shareholders 
brought a lawsuit against the majority shareholder alleging that a breach of 
fiduciary duties to the minority violated federal securities laws.117  The Supreme 
Court found that a breach of the duty of fair dealing to minority stockholders by 
itself did not fall within the definition of “fraud and deceit” and rejected the 
minority stockholder claim under securities laws outlawing “fraud and 
deceit.”118  As applied to fiduciaries generally, most states do not permit an 
attorney to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty to the beneficiary on grounds that 
to do so would violate attorney-client confidentiality.119  Breaches of fiduciary 
duty are therefore outside the traditional understanding of “lawlessness” that 
                                               
 113. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) 
(holding that once a company is in a competitive bidding situation and sale of the company is 
inevitable, the board is obligated to accept the highest price for the shareholders).  Though the 
ruling in Revlon applies only in a narrow set of circumstances, it is often referenced to support the 
notion that Delaware corporate law requires corporate management to favor the economic interests 
of its shareholders above all other concerns.  See, e.g., Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious 
Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 133–34 (2016); P.M. Vasudev, 
The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, and Theory: Evidence From the Field and the 
Path Onward, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 419 (2012). 
 114. Ethan G. Stone, Business Strategists and Election Commissioners: How the Meaning of 
Loyalty Varies with the Board’s Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. L. 893, 898–99 (2006) (“It 
is very difficult to prove that a fiduciary acted for an improper purpose.  Courts have, accordingly, 
identified objective conflicts of interest that cast enough doubt on a fiduciary’s motives to establish 
a ‘per se’ case for breach without any need to convince the judge of the fiduciary’s actual state of 
mind.”). 
 115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 116. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 465–67 (1977). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 471–74.  Some states have held that a breach of fiduciary duty is itself a form of 
fraud.  See, e.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 487–88 (Ky. 1991). 
 119. See Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the Attorney Owe Duties?, 
37 ACTEC L.J. 469, 489 (2011).  Washington does allow attorneys to disclose information about 
a breach of fiduciary duty to beneficiaries of court-appointed fiduciaries.  Id. at 492. 
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trigger reporting duties, and attorneys generally limit those triggers to violations 
of criminal and regulatory laws.120 
The general lack of inclusion of a breach of fiduciary within the triggering 
activities of Model Rule 1.13 is seemingly at odds with the “Framework of 
Dealing” conceptualization of client identity.  Shareholder primacy says that 
duties to shareholders—the corporation’s primary beneficiaries—are supremely 
important under corporate law.121  If the attorney ultimately owes a duty to the 
laws and norms governing her client, a violation of those duties should be of 
utmost importance.  The “Framework of Dealing” would, therefore, require 
attorneys to interpret Model Rule 1.13 to report up any known fiduciary 
violations.  Is this not a potential injury to the corporation itself, which exists to 
further the interests of its beneficiaries?  Not including violations of fiduciary 
duties among the activities that lawyers must report up would be to put the 
interests of individual directors, officers, or whoever else benefits from the 
volatile act over the interests of the corporation’s shareholders.122 
The attorney’s obligations under SOX in the event of a fiduciary violation are 
clearer. Under the regulations implementing SOX, a “material violation” 
includes “a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal 
or state law, or a similar material violation of any United States federal or state 
law.”123  This provision was added to specifically address the perception, arising 
from Santa Fe Industries, among others, that state ethical rules did not require 
attorneys to report breaches of fiduciary duty.124 
When representing a publicly traded company, the attorney will have to 
undertake the analysis of whether behavior amounts to a breach discussed above.  
However, under SOX, the attorney only needs “evidence,” rather than 
knowledge, of such a breach, and once the attorney has such evidence, she is 
required to report it up the corporate ladder.125  For attorneys representing public 
                                               
 120. Simon, supra note 6, at 1465.  On the other hand, Rutherglen argues that attorneys for a 
closely held corporation are required to act to protect the interests of shareholders, including 
reporting breaches of fiduciary duties.  See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 163–64.  Model Rule 1.6 
permits attorneys to disclose information 
to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result 
in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of 
which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services [or] to prevent, mitigate or 
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably 
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in 
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services[.] 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 121. Smith, supra note 58, at 278. 
 122. Simon, supra note 14, at 511. 
 123. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2018).  “Breach of fiduciary duty refers to any breach of fiduciary 
or similar duty to the issuer recognized under an applicable Federal or State statute or at common 
law, including but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and 
approval of unlawful transactions.”  Id. § 205.2(d). 
 124. Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 806 n.319. 
 125. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
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corporations or otherwise practicing before the SEC,126 it appears that the 
attorney has no choice but to report evidence of breaches of fiduciary duty to the 
chief legal officer or board of directors, though she has discretion over whether 
to report such evidence to the SEC.127  These requirements reflect the 
seriousness which with Congress and the SEC view violations of fiduciary duty.  
Under SOX, these violations are on par with other unlawful activities and merit 
that confidentiality be overridden to protect shareholders. 
A final question for attorneys is whether, if the attorney may report a breach 
of fiduciary duty up the corporate ladder, she may also report that breach to 
shareholders.  Under the Model Rules, again, it is not clear that attorneys have 
any reporting obligations in the event of a breach of fiduciary duty and, even if 
they do, the standard for reporting them is high and the attorneys retain 
discretion to do.128  Nonetheless, should an attorney feel confident that a breach 
is happening and feel obligated to report that breach, Model Rule 1.13 allows 
for disclosure to shareholders in certain situations.129  In closely held 
corporations, for example, shareholders are limited to a small, definable class 
which retains the ability to make decisions within the company.130  Disclosure 
of a breach to them, then, comports with Model Rule 1.13’s call to report to the 
“highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by 
applicable law.”131  In corporations where the shareholders’ ability to direct 
corporate action is more limited than in a closely held corporation, disclosure 
beyond the board of directors would likely be prevented by Model Rule 1.6.132  
The attorney must, therefore, evaluate the breach in the context of the structure 
                                               
 126. See Cramton et al., supra note 26, at 740–51 (discussing when an attorney is “‘appearing 
and practicing’ before the SEC”). 
 127. Id. at 751–52, 764, 786–87. 
 128. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 163–64. 
 131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 132. Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of the Corporate Attorney within the Takeover Context: 
Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943, 959–60 (1996) . 
Rule 1.13 appears to restrict attorneys from disclosing fiduciary violations to 
shareholders, arguably the constituency most deserving of protection in takeover 
situations.  The Rule stresses that the attorney should move cautiously ‘in the best interest 
of the organization,’ minimize any ‘disruption,’ and reduce the risk of revealing 
information to ‘persons outside the organization.  The text does not clarify whether 
shareholders are considered persons ‘outside the organization.’  The Rule goes on to say, 
however, that the attorney may reveal misconduct to ‘the highest authority that can act 
on behalf of the organization.’  As shareholders lack the authority to act on behalf of the 
corporation, this language would appear to preclude disclosure to shareholders.  Thus, 
under the current framework, ‘the strongest action a lawyer may take is to resign, but 
resignation must be triggered by harm to the corporation, not to third parties.’  The Rule 
fails to state with clarity whether shareholders are to be considered the attorney’s ‘client’ 
or mere third parties. 
Id. 
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of her client organization and decide whether confidentiality requirements trump 
her ability to report potential violations of law.  Given that confidentiality is not 
discretionary, while reporting is, and given the difficulties in identifying when a 
breach of fiduciary duty would be reportable at all, it is unlikely the rules permit, 
much less require, disclosure of fiduciary violations to shareholders in most 
situations other than in closely held corporations where there is unity between 
management and ownership.133  SOX, on the other hand, limits its reporting 
obligations and options to certain officers and directors of the client and the 
SEC.134  This perhaps makes sense in the context of public companies: 
shareholder disclosure would be nearly tantamount to public disclosure.135  
Overwhelmingly, confidentiality protections are strict in the traditional 
corporate context. 
When representing a nonprofit organization, attorneys balance confidentiality 
obligations against their client’s charitable mission.  Though a failure to further 
its mission would certainly be a violation of organizational purpose, a failure to 
further the nonprofit organization’s mission is distinct from a breach of fiduciary 
duty.  Unlike corporate law, nonprofit organizations’ missions are policed by 
state attorneys general and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rather than 
owners or beneficiaries of the organization.136  Breaches of duties, the failure to 
diligently pursue a charitable mission, and deviations from the nonprofit 
organization’s lawful mission are all subject to enforcement actions by both the 
IRS and state attorneys general.137  Corporate law, on the other hand, leaves 
enforcement of corporate duties to shareholders.138  Failure to promote the 
mission should fall within the traditional set of unlawful behaviors that trigger 
Model Rule 1.13 responsibilities, though there is little case law and few 
examples of this.  Because the failure to further a charitable mission is a violation 
of state and federal law, there are more onerous reporting requirements on 
nonprofit and tax-exempt organizations than are required of corporations, 
particularly those that are privately held.139  The New York State Attorney 
General’s 2018 lawsuit against the Donald J. Trump Foundation, for example, 
accused the charity of “persistent violation[s] of state and federal law,” including 
“improper and extensive political activity, repeated and willful self-dealing 
transactions, and failure to follow basic fiduciary obligations or to implement 
                                               
 133. See generally Paul J. Sigwarth, Note, It’s MY Privilege and I’ll Assert It If I Want to: The 
Attorney-Client Privilege in Closely-Held Corporations, 23 J. CORP. L. 345 (1998) (discussing 
closely-held corporations and attorney-client privilege). 
 134. See Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 141; Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 728, 740. 
 135. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 160. 
 136. Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through 
a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 11, 13, 17 (2009). 
 137. Id. at 13, 18. 
 138. Id. at 37. 
 139. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6033 (2012); CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 12586, 12587 (Deering 2018); 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 301–307, 311, 312 (2018). 
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even elementary corporate formalities required by law.”140 The state’s role in 
regulating charities, and the reporting requirements placed on charities, obviate 
much of the concern that animates attorney reporting duties under SOX, and 
attorneys are permitted to exercise their reporting authority under the Model 
Rules on the grounds that violating the mission is a clear violation of law. 
Government attorneys similarly balance confidentiality obligations against 
furthering the public interest.  The public nature of government lawyering 
requires that confidentiality be limited.141  The ABA explicitly contemplated this 
when drafting the Model Rules, saying in a comment: “[W]hen the client is a 
governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between 
maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or 
rectified, for public business is involved.”142  The Model Rules contain explicit 
disclosure requirements for prosecutors.143  Whistleblowing protections meant 
to protect government workers from retaliatory firing after reporting unlawful 
or inappropriate behavior apply to government lawyers.144  Statutes also create 
reporting requirements for lawyers who identify misconduct or violations of law 
within their agency.145 
Government attorneys struggle separating behavior that is harmful or counter 
to the public interest from activity with which they disagree.  These rules 
intentionally exclude matters that are not unlawful but which the lawyer 
nonetheless disagrees with as a matter of policy.  In order to eliminate the need 
for the attorney to use her own moral or political judgment about the public 
interest to guide her reporting obligations, the rules define reporting obligations 
in the specific instances mentioned above rather than define what the public 
interest is.146  These rules provide that the lawyer can report violations of law, 
                                               
 140. Petition for the Petitioner at 1, People v. Trump, 88 N.Y.S.3d 830 (N.Y. Cty. 2018) (No. 
541130/2018). 
 141. Clark, supra note 89, at 1046–47 (discussing how Freedom of Information Act and other 
federal statutes require disclosure of government documents unless there is a good reason to 
prohibit the disclosure). 
 142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 144. Robert T. Begg, Whistleblower Law and Ethics, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 224 (Patricia Salkin ed., 2d ed., 2008).   But see Jessica Wang, Protecting Government 
Attorney Whistleblowers: Why We Need an Exception to Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1063, 1063 (2013) (arguing that clarification is needed when it comes to the 
roles and responsibilities of government attorneys who must honor the attorney-client privilege and 
reveal fraudulent activity in the government to further the public interest). 
 145. Begg, supra note 144, at 221–22. 
 146. Berenson, supra note 20, at 805. 
However, it is not necessary for lawyers to be able to identify such a grand, overarching 
conception of the public interest in order for them to serve the public interest in their role 
as government attorneys.  Rather, lawyers only need to be able to identify the public 
interest in regard to the particular legal problems faced by them in their work as 
government attorneys. 
Id. at 814. 
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but the lawyer would be violating confidentiality if she were to report things that 
she merely thinks are counter to the public interest.147 
B.  Scope of Advice 
Ethical rules also govern the scope of advice that an attorney is required to 
give her client.148  Attorneys generally advise their clients on “the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”149  The Model Rules say 
that the lawyer must provide her client with the information the client (or the 
decision-makers within the client in the case of organizational representation) 
requires to act.150  An attorney’s advice must also be aimed at helping the client 
fulfill its statutorily mandated objective.151 
While attorneys are not in an attorney-client relationship with a client 
corporation’s shareholders,152 directors’ fiduciary duties require that attorneys 
advise corporate clients in such a way as to protect shareholder interests.153  For 
attorneys to disregard this information would be to deprive directors of 
necessary information and potentially participate in harming shareholders.  
Corporate law has traditionally required that management exercise its discretion 
to manage the corporation on the basis of adequate information and with 
appropriate deliberation.154  The attorney, then, works to ensure that her client’s 
decision-makers have adequate information (either from her or from some other 
source), that the decision-makers duly deliberate, and that the aforementioned 
review of information and deliberation is adequately documented. 
Under the Unary Model, we would expect that attorneys be required to advise 
corporate decision-makers on the effects of corporate action on shareholders, but 
the effects on other constituents and stakeholders to be outside the ambit of 
required legal advice.  Model Rule 2.1 seems to agree, stating that “[i]n 
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations 
                                               
 147. Begg, supra note 144, at 222–23. 
 148. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 149. Id. 
 150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also Simon, supra 
note 14, at 501 (“[U]nder traditional fiduciary principles, the lawyer’s disclosure duties are defined 
in terms of materiality; the fiduciary should disclose information the client needs or wants to make 
decisions.”). 
 151. That is not to say that the attorney must ensure that the client meets that objective.  Model 
Rule 1.16 provides that the attorney is to resign the representation if “the representation will result 
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law[.]”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.16(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 152. Hechler, supra note 132, at 958 (“[A]n attorney representing a fiduciary owes a duty of 
responsibility to his client only, and not to the fiduciary’s intended beneficiary.”). 
 153. Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 153.  “The fiduciary obligations of managers impose 
constraints on the legal position that the attorney for the organization can reasonably take on their 
behalf. The attorney must act reasonably to protect the interests of shareholders or other 
constituents of the organization to whom management owes fiduciary obligations.”  Id. 
 154. David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 243–44 (1991). 
2019] Who is the Client? 315 
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the 
client’s situation.”155  We can imagine a state in which management’s only 
affirmative mandate in a competitive takeover situation is to maximize value to 
shareholders.  What is the scope of advice that the attorney must give to a client 
in this situation?  The attorney should inform her client that the law requires the 
board to accept the higher offer and the consequences of not doing so.  The 
attorney would be wise to see to it that the board of directors has reviewed 
information about compensation to shareholders and that that review is well 
documented.  The attorney could also see to it that, in approving and rejecting 
the various offers, the board cites information about value to shareholders in its 
decision.156   Only after having accomplished those tasks has the attorney 
satisfied her professional obligations, even if the client board violates its 
fiduciary duties and decides to reject the highest takeover offer.157  The lawyer 
may advise the board on the effects of the takeover on other constituents, but the 
law does not require that decision-makers consider those effects in this narrow 
situation.  The lawyer’s advice on those matters would be superfluous to the 
client’s decision. 
Ethical rules, again, do not stand alone.  Corporate law and other 
considerations may require, either expressly or by implication, that attorneys 
advise clients on the effects of corporation actions on nonshareholder 
stakeholders.  To the extent the law requires decision-makers to consider 
nonshareholder stakeholders, however, the attorney’s duties dictate that her 
advice must encapsulate those stakeholders under the same logic.  Constituency 
director duty statutes are statutes that sought to protect directors who consider 
stakeholders beyond shareholders in their decision-making without giving 
guidance on how to do so.158  Consider the attorney advising the Connecticut 
client facing a takeover offer before 2010.159  The board of directors is under no 
                                               
 155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 156. These are, to put it mildly, a gross simplification of the role an attorney plays in counseling 
a client through a takeover.  In many transactions, lawyers draft a “fairness opinion” that explains 
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doing so, the attorney helps to ensure that boards of directors carry out the shareholders’ best 
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 158. Millon, supra note 154, at 225 n.8. 
 159. Nathan E. Standley, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the Constituency Statute, 
4 ELON L. REV. 209, 215–16 (2012).  In 2010, Connecticut’s constituency statute was changed 
from requiring that “a director of a corporation . . . shall consider, in determining what he 
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obligation to choose the path that maximizes value to the shareholders, provided 
that the board can document that it reviewed and deliberated on other relevant 
information.160  Who, other than lawyers, are tasked with counseling decision-
makers on how to satisfy that burden?  The attorney should provide the board 
with that information, or at least document that the board has reviewed such 
information.  Advising clients on issues contemplated by Model Rule 2.1 seems 
unlikely to be discretionary in these cases.  The scope of advice will necessarily 
expand and encapsulate these considerations. 
Outside clear situations like these, attorneys choose to exercise the discretion 
found in Model Rule 2.1 for a variety of reasons.161  Of course, to the extent that 
“moral, economic, social and political factors” could give rise to claims against 
a client by third parties or government regulators, the attorney should be sure to 
include that information in her advice.  Lawyers who monitor client exposure to 
tort claims and enforcement actions must educate themselves and counsel clients 
about the effects of corporate behavior on a large number of stakeholders and 
others. 
Lawyers also increasingly concern themselves with issues that, while they do 
not present an immediately identifiable legal risk, pose business risk for their 
clients.  Enterprise risk refers to financial, strategic, operational, and other 
risks.162   Though not purely a question of legal risk, attorneys are incorporating 
advising on enterprise risk into their scope of work.163  Lawyers similarly advise 
clients on so-called soft norms around issues like international human rights.  
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding 
Principles) are a nonbinding statement of suggested policies for states and 
businesses around the world to integrate respect for and protection of human 
rights into business practices.164  The Guiding Principles explicitly call for 
companies to “[t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights 
abuses as a legal compliance issue.”165  Attorneys should elevate gross violations 
of human rights to the same level of other identifiable legal risks without first 
                                               
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation” a litany of interests to stating that 
a director “may” consider those interests “in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation.”  Id.  Before 2010, Connecticut was the only state with a 
constituency statute that included this mandatory language.  Id. at 216. 
 160. Id. at 212–16.  See generally Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail, Inc., No. Civ.A 96-7167, 1997 
WL 33463657, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 09, 1997). 
 161. See generally Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2027–30 (discussing how attorneys 
conceptualize and advise clients on business risk). 
 162. Margaret Rouse, Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), SEARCHCIO, 
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/enterprise-risk-management (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
 163. Regan, Jr. & Hall, supra note 66, at 2024, 2030 (discussing how attorneys conceptualize 
and advise clients on business risk). 
 164. U.N. Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights 1 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples 
BusinessHR_EN.pdf [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
 165. Id. at 25. 
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identifying an enforcement mechanism, essentially requiring attorneys to advise 
their clients on whether they are engaging in and how to prevent violations of 
human rights norms.166  The American Bar Association endorsed the Guiding 
Principles, and in doing so noted that the Guiding Principles’ baseline of conduct 
may touch on the discretionary issues on which Model Rule 2.1 grants attorneys 
the ability to advise clients.167 
Lawyers therefore already gather information about the social, economic, and 
political impact of corporate action.168  Under the ethical rules, however, absent 
a requirement that corporate officers and directors must take those factors into 
consideration, there is no reason flowing from corporate law that the attorney 
has to counsel a client on these issues when doling out legal advice to client 
corporations. 
Nonprofit lawyers will necessarily refer to moral, economic, social, and 
political factors, as those are key to a director’s ability to satisfy her duty of 
obedience.  Surely a church director must consider the impact of her decisions 
on her parishioners, or a soup kitchen director the impact of decisions on the 
community her organization serves.  The lawyer, who owes a duty to the 
organization’s mission above any duty to its individual constituents,169 should 
see to it that her nonprofit client’s decision-makers have sufficient information 
to determine whether they are in fact fulfilling the organization’s mission. 
Government attorneys will also refer to the political consequences of client 
action when advising their government agency clients.  Political here refers not 
just to the electoral implications of government actions but to the client agency’s 
place within the government structure and the impact of government action vis-
à-vis other branches of government and within its client’s own branch.170  
Government attorneys do not just advise policy makers; they often participate in 
the creation of policy itself.171  This blurred status requires that attorneys pay 
attention to and advise their clients on the implications of their actions on the 
public and not merely the legality of government action.172 
C.  Attorney Liability 
After considering lawyers’ obligations under ethical rules, it is next necessary 
to assess the possibility of attorneys being held liable by beneficiaries of 
organizational clients and other third parties for claims based in a violation of 
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that organization’s legal purpose.  Despite not being in an attorney-client 
relationship with third parties, third parties may bring malpractice actions 
against lawyers in some situations.173 
Attorneys’ third-party liability for claims based in corporate law in the 
corporate context is well understood.174  The Unary Model would suggest that 
shareholders may be able to sue attorneys for malpractice if the corporation takes 
actions that go against shareholder interests.175  Conversely, attorneys should not 
be liable for claims arising under corporate law to nonshareholder constituents 
for harms caused to them by corporate action. 
Attorneys can in fact be found liable to shareholders under two theories: 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.176   States that have 
been confronted with the aiding and abetting theory of attorney liability have 
largely allowed a beneficiary to bring a claim against an attorney.177  To bring 
these claims, shareholders need not show that the attorney owes the shareholder 
a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship.178  Rather, it is sufficient to 
show that the attorney “knowingly and actively participates in the breach of 
fiduciary duties by another.”179  There are four elements of a successful aiding 
and abetting in a break of fiduciary duty claim against an attorney: (1) that there 
was a fiduciary duty owed; (2) that the fiduciary duty was breached; (3) that the 
lawyer was aware of the fiduciary relationship;180 and (4) that the lawyer 
substantially assisted in her client’s breach of the fiduciary duty.181 
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Aiding and abetting liability creates the possibility for lawyers to be held 
liable for behavior that otherwise complies with rules of professional conduct.  
If breaching a fiduciary duty to shareholders does not rise to the level of behavior 
that triggers attorney reporting requirements, as discussed above, the attorney 
may still find herself being sued by that shareholder for aiding and abetting her 
client board’s action.  Attorneys should, therefore, take potential breaches of 
fiduciary duty up the corporate ladder, even if they are not clearly fraudulent.  If 
none of the persons with authority within a client takes action to remedy the 
breach, the attorney should consider firing the client to avoid risking liability 
herself.182 
Negligence claims, on the other hand, can occur when the attorney breaches a 
duty to the nonclient third party.183  According to the Restatement (Third) on the 
Law Governing Lawyers, lawyers may owe a duty of care to nonclient third 
parties who “rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services,” 
to whom the “client intends as one of the primary objectives of the representation 
that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient[,]” and when “the lawyer’s client 
is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary acting primarily to perform similar 
functions for the nonclient[.]”184  Many courts have adopted this standard when 
adjudicating third-party claims against lawyers.185 
Corporate lawyers risk being successfully sued for negligent representation 
by shareholders harmed by corporate misconduct.186  When attorneys prepare 
legal opinions and other documents that will be read and relied upon by 
shareholders in making investments in a client company, attorneys may be liable 
to the extent that those statements contain misrepresentations.187  Attorneys 
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ought to keep this standard in mind when preparing these documents.  Is the 
attorney describing accurately and in good faith the effect of some action on 
shareholder value?  If not, does that omission rise to the level of 
misrepresentation? 
The law around attorney liability to third parties for claims grounded in 
corporate law reflects corporate law’s acceptance of shareholder primacy.  
Shareholders, as the primary beneficiary of corporate activity, may sue attorneys 
when their clients fail to further their interests.  Criminal or tortious behavior or 
regulatory violations can lead to attorney liability to shareholders and other 
parties.188  So, while attorneys may find themselves liable to shareholders when 
corporate fiduciary duties are breached, liability to nonshareholder third parties 
will not be based in corporate law.189 
It is now possible to revisit Red Corp.’s attorney’s ethical obligations in more 
detail in two specific contexts: first, in the case that a fiduciary of Red Corp. is 
breaching a duty to Red Corp.’s shareholders and, second, in the case of a 
constituent engaging in behavior that is harmful to a nonshareholder stakeholder.  
In the first, the attorney has the option, though not the obligation, to raise her 
concerns up the chain of command within her client corporation.  Confidentiality 
protects her from reporting this violation outside of the client corporation.  If the 
company is publicly traded, however, the attorney must go up the ladder within 
the corporation if the violation is material and may ultimately report her 
concerns to the SEC.190  She will advise her client on the legal and, perhaps, 
business risk of this violation.  She may also be liable to shareholders for aiding 
and abetting the breach and, if she participated in crafting certain 
representations, liable to those shareholders for negligent misrepresentation as 
well. 
Suppose, however, that Red Corp. is engaging in behavior that is harmful to 
some nonshareholder constituent—dumping waste in a nearby river, for 
example.  If this activity is unlawful, the attorney’s reporting options and 
obligations may be triggered.  If it is not, the attorney is under no obligation to 
go up the chain of the company and confidentiality prevents her from reporting 
this activity externally.  She will advise her client on the legal and business risks 
of this activity, to the extent they exist, but is not required to advise her client on 
the harmful effects of this behavior.  If there is no criminal or civil liability 
associated with the dumping, there is no violation for the attorney to aid and 
abet.  The attorney may find herself liable to third parties if they relied on 
                                               
1995) (finding an attorney to a land owner assumed a duty to a nonclient purchaser to provide 
reliable information regarding the land). 
 188. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 25, at 395–97 (discussing government enforcement action 
brought against a large law firm on the basis of misrepresentation). 
 189. See id. at 400. 
 190. See Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-The-Ladder Reporting 
By Insulting In-House Corporate Attorneys From Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 861, 
863–64 (2015). 
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statements by Red Corp. that Red Corp. is an environmentally responsible 
company when transacting with Red Corp., but those claims would not be 
grounded in corporate law. 
The following sections explore these situations for the attorney representing 
Green Corp., suggesting that a change in corporate purpose should result in 
different ethical obligations for Green Corp.’s attorneys. 
III.  THE BENEFIT CORPORATION DEPARTS FROM TRADITIONAL CORPORATE 
LAW 
In order to understand how the benefit corporation will affect a lawyer’s 
ethical duties, it is first necessary to understand what benefit corporations are 
and what problem they were created to address.  The benefit corporation’s 
backers created the benefit corporation in response to the perception that 
purpose-driven work can be done by nonprofit organizations alone and that 
traditional corporate forms can conduct profit-driven work only.191  To these 
advocates, corporate law, which requires that directors prioritize the interests of 
shareholders above all else, prevents corporations from pursuing a mission.192  
Benefit corporations are a response to two concepts found in corporate law: 
shareholder primacy specifically and private law generally. Benefit corporation 
legislation is designed to give founders and shareholders the ability to opt out of 
a private law regime and into a public law regime, as well as avoid onerous tax 
requirements and the prohibition on distributions to owners that limit charities’ 
ability to conduct commercial activity.193  In this next Section, I describe the 
motivation behind the benefit corporation and its major features. 
A.  What Were Benefit Corporations Enacted to Address? 
Movements emerged over the last several decades that attempted to move 
corporate law, or at least corporate management practices, toward recognition 
of the effects of corporate behavior on society at large.  The Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) movement embraced the general principle that 
corporations have a responsibility to society at large.194  Relatedly, progressive 
corporate law sought to broaden the focus of corporate law and recognize that 
the corporation is at its heart a “public institution with public obligations.”195  
Progressive corporate law came to stand for “a loose term for a collection of 
proposals aimed at remaking corporate law to encourage processes and 
                                               
 191. See generally Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise 
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009) (noting the distinct boundaries between non-profit and for-
profit corporations and discussing how this boundary has been rejected by social entrepreneurs in 
creating hybrid social enterprises). 
 192. Id. at 362; Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note 50, at 825–38. 
 193. See Plerhoples, supra note 7, at 542–43 (describing the statutory requirement for public 
benefit corporations in Delaware). 
 194. Kelley, supra note 191, at 348–49. 
 195. MITCHELL, supra note 17, at xiii. 
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outcomes more beneficial to the interests of nonshareholders with significant 
stakes in a corporation’s activities (i.e., stakeholders).”196 
In more recent years, a social enterprise movement also emerged.  The social 
enterprise movement seeks to use commercial methods to solve societal 
problems traditionally associated with the charitable sector.197  To backers of 
social enterprise, neither the traditional for-profit businesses nor charitable 
sectors were suited to tackling major social issues.  On the one hand, the for-
profit sector was too focused on maximizing profits over the short-term at the 
expense of nonshareholder stakeholders.198  The charitable sector, on the other 
hand, faced too many regulations that limited the range of activities 
organizations could undertake to address social issues.199 
Again, the doctrine of shareholder primacy holds that corporate fiduciaries 
must prioritize the interests of shareholders above those of all other 
stakeholders.200  Shareholder interests are often defined as maximizing return on 
investment,201 or at least economic interests.202  Maximizing return on 
shareholder investment necessarily entails maximizing corporate profit.203  
These movements argued that corporate law came to be seen as a matter of 
purely private law that regulates the corporation’s relationship with its 
shareholders, while other areas of law regulated the corporation’s relations with 
stakeholders, such as employees or suppliers.204  Because corporations represent 
the interests of their shareholders, founders lack a mechanism through which 
they can ensure that a business sticks to its mission as it grows.  New investors 
will elect new directors who are not bound by the ideals and goals of the 
                                               
 196. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1352. 
 197. See id. at 1353 (“‘Social enterprise’ is a loose term for businesses that aim to generate 
profits while advancing social goals.”); see also Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: 
Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 631 
(2016) (“[S]ocial enterprises are businesses that make profits both for the benefit of the owners’ 
compensation as well as the advancement of a specific social purpose or mission.”); Plerhoples, 
supra note 5, at 225 (“According to Social Enterprise Alliance, Inc., a non-profit organization that 
promotes the goals of social enterprise, a social enterprise must ‘directly address an intractable 
social need and serve[ ] the common good, either through its products and services or through the 
number of disadvantaged people it employs.’  For others, social enterprise means ‘blended 
enterprise’ or double or triple bottom line businesses—i.e., ‘entit[ies] that intend[ ] to pursue profits 
and social good both in tandem and by making considered choices to pursue one over the other.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 198. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1362. 
 199. See id. 
 200. Smith, supra note 58, at 277–78. 
 201. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1018–19 
(2013). 
 202. Id. at 1013. 
 203. Id. at 1018–19. 
 204. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 42 (2006) (noting how contemporary corporate law doctrine 
overlooks the wellbeing of the corporation’s employees). 
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corporation’s founders.205  This is precisely what happened with Etsy—
following an initial public offering, shareholders replaced the company’s board 
of directors and prevented Etsy from converting into a public benefit 
corporation.206 
Tax-exempt organizations, on the other hand, face strict limits on their ability 
to engage in commercial activities,207 have limited access to capital, and may 
not compensate executives and others in a way that competes with the for-profit 
sector.208  Further, nonprofit organizations are prohibited from distributing 
profits to owners—a clear and insurmountable barrier to using profit-making 
enterprises to address social ills.209 
As a result of these two doctrines, social enterprise boosters believed that 
traditional corporate forms were not suited to the task of social enterprise and 
that new corporate forms were required to implement the dual social enterprise 
mission.210  These new forms could “reduce transaction costs for aspiring social 
entrepreneurs, provide them with conspicuous and inexpensive signals to 
potential supporters who share their social aims, shape preferences by enabling 
and encouraging prospective entrepreneurs to pursue broader social aims, and 
nudge controller and employee behavior in more other-regarding directions.”211  
New forms would allow social entrepreneurs to embed a social mission into the 
organization’s organizational documents and signal that mission to consumers, 
investors, and the public.  These new entity forms that emerged are often referred 
to as double- or triple-bottom-line entities because they incorporate social and/or 
environmental outcomes in addition to financial results into their performance 
metrics.212  Among those forms are the benefit corporation,213 the low-cost 
limited liability company or L3C, special purpose corporation, and benefit 
limited liability company.214 
                                               
 205. Kelley, supra note 191, at 359–60. 
 206. See Gelles, supra note 2. 
 207. “[C]haritable nonprofit organizations may nonetheless earn profits and engage in some 
commercial activity, although income earned from business activities that do not contribute 
importantly to the carrying out of the exempt purpose of the charity is subject to federal income 
tax.”  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 1.01 cmt. f (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 208. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1362. 
 209. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 685–
86 (2013). 
 210. Page & Katz, supra note 16, at 1353. 
 211. Id. at 1373. 
 212. Roxanne Thorelli, Note, Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for Directors Within 
Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit Note, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
1749, 1750 (2017). 
 213. This is referred to as the Public Benefit Corporation in Delaware, Colorado, and 
Minnesota.  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–7-101-509 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) 
(2018); MINN. STAT. § 304A (2018). 
 214. See Tu, supra note 113, at 142. 
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In order to understand how benefit corporations affect attorneys’ ethical 
duties, it is important to understand exactly which features of traditional 
corporations they sought to change.  An analysis of the advocacy around the 
adoption of benefit corporation legislation and the legislative history of these 
statutes finds corporate law’s narrow focus on shareholder interests as a key 
complaint of the form’s initial boosters.  To the form’s founders, shareholder 
primacy affected who has the ability to act on behalf of the corporation, what 
duties those decision-makers owed, and what stakeholders other than 
shareholders decisions makers were to take into account.215 
The benefit corporation form was first proposed by William Clark of Drinker 
Biddle & Reath LLP.  Clark wrote that “[i]t is against the paradigm of 
shareholder primacy that directors and their advisors analyze corporate decision 
making.”216  This paradigm, according to Clark, makes it difficult for for-profit 
entities to incorporate a mission into their corporate purpose.217  Directors are 
elected by shareholders, and so there is no one with decision-making authority 
in the company who is accountable to or responsible for the interests of any 
constituents aside from shareholders.218  Fiduciary duty law holds that directors 
owe duties to shareholders alone and that it is, therefore, “difficult for the 
directors of mission-driven companies to feel they are legally protected in 
considering the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders who have 
elected them.”219  Absent guidance and protections for directors contained in the 
benefit corporation legislation, Clark reasoned that directors will not take 
nonshareholder stakeholders into account and pursue a mission in addition to 
profit.220 
State legislatures similarly pointed to shareholder primacy and the shareholder 
value maximization norm as the reason that states needed to create benefit 
corporations.221  The New York Senate, for example, stated that “socially-
minded companies are often left with the catch-22 of either not being able to 
earn a profit or opening their directors up to possible personal liability for 
decisions that do not maximize shareholder value, or increasingly going to states 
other than New York that are pursuing this corporate form” when passing their 
statute.222  Likewise California legislators found that “[i]n a traditional 
                                               
 215. See William H. Clark et al., The Need And Rationale For The Benefit Corporation: Why 
It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs Of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, 
Ultimately, the Public, BENEFITCORP.NET 14 (Jan. 13, 2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/ 
files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf (discussing the benefit corporation and the legal 
uncertaintites faced by directors of for-profit mission-driven entities when making decisions for 
their companies). 
 216. Id. at 8. 
 217. Id. at 7. 
 218. Id. at 8. 
 219. Id. at 10. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1, 8, 14. 
 222. S.B. 79, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
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corporation directors are required to utilize good faith in taking actions for the 
best interests of the corporation and the shareholders.  A main goal is to 
maximize shareholder value.  Directors are liable to shareholders in cases where 
shareholders disagree with not-for-profit activities.”223  Clearly, state legislators 
believe that corporate law elevates the interests of shareholders above all others 
and embraces a private ordering regime and that a new corporate form was 
required to allow mission-driven companies to pursue a public benefit in 
addition to profit.224 
The following sections describe features common to most benefit corporation 
statutes.  It is noteworthy that drafters of the benefit corporation statutes elected 
the structure they did instead of other options that could result in more direct 
nonshareholder influence on corporate governance.  One such option would be 
to set aside seats on the board of directors for representatives of nonshareholder 
groups themselves, rather than a benefit director who is not required to be a 
member of any particular stakeholder constituency.225  Drafters could also have 
delegated responsibility for certain decisions away from corporate management 
to stakeholders themselves, or perhaps made management accountable to 
someone other than the board of directors and, therefore, the shareholders.226  By 
rejecting these ideas, architects of the benefit corporation have embraced the 
notion that the structure of corporate governance as currently practiced—a board 
of directors elected by shareholders—is not an insurmountable impediment to 
creating a public benefit.  To these advocates, pursuing a public benefit is a 
                                               
 223. Flexible Purpose Corporations: Corporate Mergers, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON BANKING & 
FIN. 5 (June 20, 2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-
0250/sb_201_cfa_20110617_111833_asm_comm.html. 
 224. See also Final Bill Report SHB 2239, HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (June 7, 2012), 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2011-12/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/2239-S%20HBR%2 
0FBR%2012.pdf (stating that “[u]nder the WBCA, a corporation’s directors and officers have a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation – an obligation to act in its best interests.  This duty has been 
interpreted as a responsibility to maximize financial returns for shareholders.  The risk of liability 
can arise for directors and officers if they make decisions on the basis of some mission, at the 
expense of maximizing shareholder value.  Such decisions could be interpreted as a breach of the 
duty to act solely in the corporation’s best interests”). 
 225. Millon, supra note 154, at 147.  The idea of incorporating stakeholder governance into 
corporate law has been expressed by many scholars.  See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward 
a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 49 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (noting 
how giving stakeholders enforcement power could be accomplished by granting stakeholders board 
representation); J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61, 
64 (2017) (advocating for the creation of “stakeholder advisory boards” to promote the 
representation of “employees, creditors, customers, vendors, the community, and the 
environment”); Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 311 (2011) (suggesting 
corporate law reforms that “integrate[] stakeholders in corporate decision-making”).  Many 
European countries required that workers actually be represented on company boards of directors.  
See Jackson, supra 225, at 310–11. 
 226. Millon, supra note 201, at 1019. 
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question of management focus and to whom officers and directors owe a duty 
rather than a structural issue.227 
B.  Benefit Corporations 
Compared to other new corporate forms, the benefit corporation has been 
adopted by the largest number of states228 and is the preferred corporate form of 
choice for thousands of corporations,229 including double- or triple-bottom-line 
entity corporations publicly traded.230  Many state statutes are based on the 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model Legislation”),231 drafted by 
the nonprofit organization B Lab.232  The Model Legislation has several features 
that both represent a departure from the traditional corporate form and have 
implications for lawyers representing these entities.  A brief summary of these 
changes follows. 
Public Benefit: The Model Legislation provides that benefit corporations are 
to have the purpose, enshrined in the company’s charter, of “creating a general 
public benefit.”233  “General public benefit” is defined as “[a] material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation assessed taking into account the impacts of 
the benefit corporation as reported against a third-party standard.”234  Comments 
to the Model Legislation note that this requires “consideration of all of the effects 
of the business on society and the environment.”235  The benefit corporation also 
has the option to adopt a specific public benefit purpose in addition to the general 
public benefit purpose.236 
                                               
 227. See Millon, supra note 154, at 225 (discussing how these new corporate benefit statutes 
impose new duties on management to consider the interests of communities and employees when 
making decisions). 
 228. Social Enterprise Law Tracker, SOC. ENTER. L. TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/ 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
 229. Murray, supra note 3, at 589 (finding 2,636 entities organized as benefit corporations or 
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 230. Gensler, supra note 12; see generally J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social 
Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes, BELMONT U. (2015) (comparing different corporate 
forms in various states). 
 231. Murray, supra note 225, at 86–87. 
 232. Mystica M. Alexander, Benefit Corporations –  The Latest Development in the Evolution 
of Social Enterprise: Are They Worthy of a Taxpayer Subsidy?, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 219, 245 
(2014). 
 233. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. § 201(a), at 10 (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_9_16.pdf. 
 234. Id. § 102, at 3. 
 235. Id. § 102 cmt., at 6. 
 236. Id. § 201(b), at 10.  The Model Legislation provides a suggested list of specific public 
benefit purposes: 
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial 
products or services; (2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities 
beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring 
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Consideration of Stakeholder Interests: The Model Legislation requires 
directors to consider the impact of corporate action on non-shareholder 
stakeholders and the public.237  The Model Legislation gives no guidance to how 
the board of directors shall weigh the interests of these stakeholders;238 rather, 
the Model Legislation states that directors need not give one group priority over 
another unless doing so is specifically called for.239 
Public Reporting and Third-Party Standard: Benefit corporations are to 
prepare and make public annual benefit reports that describe, among others, 
“[t]he ways in which the benefit corporation pursued general public benefit 
during the year and the extent to which general public benefit was created” and 
“[a]n assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of the 
benefit corporation . . . against a third-party standard[.]”240  These third-party 
standards, which report “overall social and environmental performance of a 
                                               
the environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts, sciences, or 
advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose 
to benefit society or the environment; and (7) conferring any other particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
Id. § 102, at 4–5. 
 237. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations –  A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 598–99 (2011).  Boards of directors should consider their actions on a 
variety of parties, including: 
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and work force of the 
benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers; (iii) the interests of customers as 
beneficiaries of the general public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose of the 
benefit corporation; (iv) community and societal factors, including those of each 
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its 
suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the short-term and long-
term interests of the benefit corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit 
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best 
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability of 
the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and any specific 
public benefit purpose[,] 
in addition to any additional groups listed in the benefit corporation’s charter.  Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(a)(1), at 12. 
 238. See id. § 301, at 12–13 (listing the factors the board of directors should consider when 
making decisions); see also Reiser, supra note 237, at 610 (suggesting “[i]deally, a hybrid 
organization would offer a solution to this dual mission dilemma.  To solve it, a hybrid form of 
organization should provide guidance on which goal, profit maximization or social good 
production, has priority and in what situations this priority must be given.  This does not necessarily 
mean that either profit maximization or social good production must be prioritized every time the 
two come into conflict.  In order to ease the tension inherent in a dual mission organization, some 
structure is needed for balancing these goals.  This structure must work predictably and relatively 
transparently, and there must be some method for enforcing it”). 
 239. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 301(a)(3), at 12. 
 240. Id. § 401(a)(1)(i), (a)(2), at 20. 
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business[,]” are created not by legislatures but by organizations like B Lab241 
that evaluate corporate activity and its social and environmental effects.242 
Director Liability: The Model Legislation grants immunity to directors who 
take the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders into account when making 
decisions,243 or for their failure to pursue or create general public benefit.244  
Further, directors have no duty to individual beneficiaries of the corporation’s 
general or specific public benefit, and such individuals may not bring suit against 
directors unless specifically authorized to do so in the corporation’s charter.245 
Benefit Enforcement Proceedings: Although directors are not liable to 
corporate beneficiaries themselves, directors, shareholders holding five percent 
or more of the corporation’s stock, persons designated in the company’s charter, 
or the benefit corporation itself may bring a “benefit enforcement proceeding” 
against the company and its directors and officers for “failure . . . to pursue or 
create a general public benefit” or other failure to comply with the requirements 
of the Model Legislation.246  Parties who file “benefit enforcement proceedings” 
may request injunctive relief only.247  There is no other claim that can be brought 
against a benefit corporation or its directors for failure to follow the provisions 
of the Model Legislation.248 
Benefit Director and Officer: Benefit corporations may have a designated 
benefit director, who is tasked with preparing the benefit report mentioned above 
and overseeing the creation of a public benefit generally.249  Benefit 
Corporations may also designate a benefit officer, who assists the benefit 
director in the preparation of the benefit report.250 
Though many states have based their benefit corporation statutes off of the 
Model Legislation, the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Act, which became 
effective in 2013,251 differs in several major respects.  These differences are 
important for attorneys representing Delaware public benefit corporations to 
understand as they consider their ethical duties.  For one, while Delaware public 
benefit corporations do have to prepare written benefit reports for their 
                                               
 241. Id. § 102, at 5; see J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. 
REV. 25, 31 (2015). 
 242. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 233, § 102, at 5. 
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stockholders, they do not have to make those reports public and they do not have 
to judge their efforts against a third-party standard unless so stated in the 
certificate of incorporation.252  Rather than considering the interests of 
nonshareholder stakeholders, directors of Delaware public benefit corporations 
are to “balance[] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of 
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public 
benefit or public benefits identified in [the corporation’s] certificate of 
incorporation.”253  Delaware also does not provide for benefit enforcement 
proceedings,254 though stockholders holding at least two percent of the 
company’s stock can bring derivative suits for failure to abide by the statute’s 
duties.255 
A prominent example of a Delaware public benefit corporation is Laureate 
Education, the first company organized as a benefit corporation in any state to 
go public in the United States.256 Laureate Education defines its specific public 
purpose in its certificate of incorporation as: 
to produce a positive effect (or a reduction of negative effects) for 
society and persons by offering diverse education programs delivered 
online and on premises operated in the communities that we serve, as 
the board of directors may from time to time determine to be 
appropriate and within the Corporation’s overall education mission.257 
No benefit director or officer is named to oversee this mission, and no group 
or individual is granted the right to bring a derivate suit or any kind of 
enforcement proceeding against the company.258  Further, the certificate of 
incorporation does not require the company to judge its efforts against a third-
party standard.  Laureate Education is also a Certified B Corp., and so, while it 
does not have to utilize a third-party standard under Delaware law, it does strive 
to comply with B Corp. standards.259 
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C.  Greenwashing 
The drafters of the Model Legislation were particularly concerned with 
guarding against greenwashing, which they defined as “the phenomenon of 
businesses seeking to portray themselves as being more environmentally and 
socially responsible than they actually are.”260  There are two ways that 
greenwashing could be a violation of the Model Legislation—one based on 
process and the other on outcome.261  A process-related claim of greenwashing 
would entail the failure to abide by the reporting requirements of the Model 
Legislation262 or the failure to consider the impact of corporate action on non-
shareholder stakeholders and the public.263  An outcome-related claim, on the 
other hand, would involve the failure to further a general or specific public 
benefit, as measured against a third-party standard.264  Both should give rise to 
benefit enforcement proceedings under the Model Legislation.265  Status as a 
benefit corporation is a strong representation that a business is environmentally 
and socially responsible; failing to create (or attempt to create) a general or 
specific public benefit, therefore, constitutes greenwashing.266 
Regardless of its basis, any greenwashing claim brought as a benefit 
enforcement proceeding will need to overcome the business judgment rule.267  
Like traditional corporate directors, benefit corporation directors are protected 
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by the business judgment rule.268  Corporate law generally provides that if 
directors exercise due care and reasonably believe that actions are in the best 
interests of the shareholders and the corporation they will not be liable for 
breaches of fiduciary duty.269  The business judgment rule exists to give 
management a safe harbor for most decisions.270  The business judgment rule is 
a broad defense and overcoming the business judgment rule in suits against 
traditional corporations is difficult.271  Likewise, greenwashing claims brought 
as benefit enforcement proceedings will need to show that directors failed to be 
“informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the 
director reasonably believes to be appropriate” and “rationally believes that the 
business judgment is in the best interests of the benefit corporation.”272 
IV. REPRESENTING THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 
Benefit corporation legislation will necessarily impact legal ethics.  The 
“Framework of Dealing” embraces the Multiary Model for attorneys 
representing benefit corporations.273 Nonshareholder stakeholders who are 
intended beneficiaries of corporate actions come within the “Framework of 
Dealing” insofar as the corporation is mandated to create a benefit for, or at least 
consider its effects on, these shareholders.274  That is not to say, however, that 
these nonshareholder stakeholders are the attorney’s client and that any duties 
flow to them on account of being in an attorney-client relationship with the 
lawyer.  The nonshareholder stakeholder instead is in the position vis-à-vis the 
attorney of the beneficiary of a trust or other fiduciary relationship; their interests 
place bounds around actions that corporations can take and therefore also around 
advice that attorneys can dispense, and the attorney must act to protect their 
interests over the interests of individual directors and officers.275 
The “Framework of Dealing” requires the attorney for the benefit corporation 
to take into account both the changes to corporate structure brought about by 
benefit corporation legislation and the altered corporate purpose.  As discussed 
above, the attorney must identify when a benefit director, benefit officer, or 
shareholder has special authority within the corporation on matters of public 
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benefit.  Second, the lawyer must guide her client toward taking into account or 
furthering the purpose of the corporation as contained in the corporation’s 
governing documents and corporate statute.  In this Section, I attempt to analyze 
those obligations in more detail under existing rules.  In Section V below, I 
propose several changes or clarification to existing rules and regulations. 
A.  The Citizen Lawyer 
Representing benefit corporations requires a new framework that moves 
norms for these attorneys away from the model of traditional corporate 
representation.  The current model of corporate representation is ill-suited to 
representing clients like Green Corp. whose purpose is to further the public 
interest.  As explained above, these frameworks necessarily disregard the impact 
of legal advice and client activity on nonclient third parties absent the 
identification of legal risk arising from regulatory or legal requirements.  Benefit 
corporation legislation does not just impose an external requirement on 
corporations that they produce a public benefit; rather, it attempts to embed that 
purpose within the structure and duties that bind the corporation and its decision-
makers.276  Attorneys for benefit corporations should draw on other contexts, 
such as those of nonprofit and government lawyers described above, in defining 
this framework. 
A historical perspective is also illustrative for benefit corporation lawyers.  In 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, corporate law was seen as a public 
ordering regime and it was accepted that attorneys also owed responsibilities to 
the public.277  American corporations were viewed as public entities created by 
the government rather than entities formed by contract.278  Early corporate 
charters narrowly defined the scope of corporate authority.279  They also 
acknowledged that corporations were created by the state and were public 
entities serving a public purpose or public benefit.280  At that time, it was also 
accepted that attorneys owed responsibilities to the public.281  Some describe a 
“citizen lawyer,” who is tasked in the non-litigation context with “guiding the 
client to comply with the underlying spirit or purpose as well as the letter of laws 
and regulations to desist from unlawful conduct, and if needed, to do so with 
strong advice backed by the threat of withdrawal, and in extreme cases, of 
disclosure.”282  These earlier notions of the role of the attorney provide guidance 
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on how attorneys for benefit corporations should practice.  Like lawyers of old, 
lawyers for benefit corporations should incorporate as part of their counsel 
guiding corporate decision-makers toward furthering public benefit and against 
“socially destructive activity”283 since benefit corporations were designed to 
prevent such activity.284 
Rather than focus primarily on risks to their client, legal or otherwise, citizen 
lawyers question the impact of client action on the rights of others and on the 
legal system itself.  The paradigm of the citizen lawyer plays out in the 
transactional context as follows: 
In advising clients outside litigation, the citizen lawyer is the “wise 
counselor,” who sees her job as guiding the client to comply with the 
underlying spirit or purpose as well as the letter of laws and 
regulations to desist from unlawful conduct, and if needed, to do so 
with strong advice backed by the threat of withdrawal, and in extreme 
cases, of disclosure.  If the client needs her help to resist or change 
unfavorable law, she makes the challenge public and transparent, to 
facilitate its authoritative resolution.  Her private-minded counterpart 
is of course the hired gun, whose sole concern is with minimizing 
adverse effects of law on his client’s plans and profits.  The neutral 
version of the lawyer-agent simply identifies legal constraints and 
advises clients on risks of detection and costs of noncompliance.  The 
aggressive or hardball lawyer-agent enthusiastically undertakes to 
bend; stretch; punch loopholes in; and nullify by obstruction, 
concealment, and delay the legal and regulatory constraints in the path 
of a client’s desires and interests.285 
The view of the lawyer as public citizen was explicitly adopted by the 
profession around the turn of the twentieth century.286  Canon 32 of the original 
1908 Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association admonished lawyers 
not to provide any service or advice involving “deception or betrayal of the 
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public.”287  The lawyer’s highest honor, according to these original rules, was to 
be found in the fidelity to both “private trust” and “public duty.”288 
The citizen lawyer was rendered archaic by the middle of the last century but 
drew new attention after attorneys involved in the Enron scandal grounded their 
defense of their role in the scandal in compliance with their professional 
responsibility obligations.289  The turn of the twenty-first century, of course, saw 
a series of corporate scandals, the largest of which was the Enron scandal.290  
These scandals, and Enron in particular, caused scholars and practitioners to 
question the wisdom of a profession that had no duty to the legal system itself 
or the spirit of the law.291  In the Enron example, Enron’s attorneys implied that, 
although they identified fraudulent accounting measures, they were not required 
to report the use of such measures.292  The notion that purposeful concealment 
of information used in fraud violates neither the law nor professional norms 
undermined the respect of the legal profession in the eyes of the public.293 
Following this wave of scandals, Chancellor Allen proposed a reinvigoration 
of the norm of professional independence in which attorneys seek to further 
client interests while at the same time “satisfying the underlying goals of the 
law.”294  By doing so, lawyers would both further the purpose of regulatory 
schemes and gain a competitive advantage by attracting clients interested in 
furthering the goals of laws or regulations themselves.295  This paradigm, 
according to Allen, would assist in the successful legal regimes and improve the 
profession for its practitioners.296 
Adherence to norms and clear understanding of the aims of regulation are 
therefore essential to a functioning regulatory scheme—lawyers and clients must 
be flexible when trying to achieve regulatory ends and, when such achievement 
is impossible, transparent in their shortcomings for regulators to see and respond 
to.297  Clients and attorneys who fail in this regard will find themselves at odds 
with regulators and constantly striving to stay ahead of regulatory reform aimed 
at curbing the very behavior in which they are engaged.298  Ethical norms aimed 
at preventing corporate misconduct and bolstering the regulatory state both make 
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sense if we view the benefit corporation as a public ordering scheme.  If benefit 
corporations are accountable through corporate law to or for their effects on 
nonshareholder stakeholders, attorneys should be mindful of those effects and 
counsel their clients thusly.  Further, if a benefit corporation is more than an 
organization operating merely for the benefit of its owners,299 attorneys should 
represent corporate clients with that regulatory state in mind. 
Attorneys for benefit corporations should draw on the ideas of the citizen 
lawyer.  They should recognize that they owe a duty not just to their client but 
also the public their client purports to benefit.  They should seek to practice in a 
way that furthers the mission of benefit corporation legislation, rather than 
ensuring that their client complies with the letter of the Model Legislation only.  
Finally, they should guard against the clients engaging in harmful behavior that 
runs counter to the spirit of the Model Legislation. 
B.  Confidentiality and Reporting 
Attorneys for benefit corporations should balance the duty to protect the 
interests of nonshareholder stakeholders and the public against their 
confidentiality obligations.  This balance first affects how broad the circle of 
confidently extends.  The nature of benefit corporation legislation may bring 
certain shareholders within that circle of confidentiality, at least with respect to 
matters of public benefit and compliance with the authorizing statute.  Further, 
as with fiduciary breaches in traditional corporate law, certain reporting 
obligations or options under the Model Rules and SOX may be triggered by a 
client constituent engaging in greenwashing. 
Again, the Model Legislation grants rights of action to certain shareholder 
groups in the event of violation of benefit corporation legislation.300  Those 
rights of action should bring those shareholders within the circle of 
confidentiality.  Since these shareholders can only bring suits for injunctive 
relief in most states and are prevented from extracting any money from the 
corporation, these shareholders have a form of internal control right.  In 
exercising that control right, these shareholders take the role of the “highest 
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable 
law.”301  The Model Legislation also allows benefit corporations to designate to 
other parties the right to bring suit against the company for similar violations.302  
Absent any ownership interest in the company, the third party’s connection with 
the entity would be limited to being granted a right to sue.303  This position is 
more comparable to a counterparty to a contract: the third party’s right to control 
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corporate action is completely outside the corporate structure.  These entities 
should remain outside the circle of confidentially. 
Doubtless, there will be benefit corporations that refuse or are otherwise 
unwilling to make decisions that further the public good enshrined in their 
governing documents.  Some may ignore the effects of corporate action on 
employees or customers or the environment before making a decision; others 
may refuse to change course from a direction shown to be detrimental. Still 
others will fail to satisfy some third-party standard for creating a public benefit.  
Each is greenwashing by violating the benefit corporation purpose, analogous to 
fiduciary breaches in the traditional corporate context. 
For benefit corporations, greenwashing prompts many of the same questions 
that traditional corporations’ attorneys face with breaches of fiduciary duties.  
Greenwashing, again, refers to organizations that market themselves as being 
environmentally sustainable or otherwise beneficial to the public, often taking 
advantage of third-party certifications or corporate forms like the benefit 
corporation, without actually creating the benefit they claim to promote.304  As 
discussed above, whistleblowing or reporting obligations under the Model Rules 
in the case of a breach of corporate purpose are weak.305  The rules offer little 
guidance on when a violation of corporate purpose exists and, even if one is 
identified, reporting is left to the attorney’s discretion.  If breaches of fiduciary 
duties to shareholders do not generally fall under the umbrella of reportable 
activity under the Model Rules, then greenwashing should not either. 
For publicly traded benefit corporations, SOX should include greenwashing 
when committed by benefit corporations among the activities that trigger 
reporting obligations.306  Under SOX, a “material violation” includes “a material 
breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a 
similar material violation of any United States federal or state law.”307  
Greenwashing is a failure to create a “material positive impact on society and 
the environment,” which is a requirement of creating a public benefit under the 
Model Legislation.308  Harm to nonshareholder constituents that does not rise to 
the level of fraud should nonetheless qualify as a “similar material violation” 
under state law.309 
Assuming that reporting options or obligations exist, identifying 
greenwashing can be difficult.  Acts that fail to further a public interest 
contravene the purpose of benefit corporation legislation.  Absent a clear 
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showing of avoidable social or environmental harm, however, it may be difficult 
for an attorney to ascertain what, exactly, constitutes behavior that is detrimental 
to the public interest.  The benefit corporation may identify stakeholders in its 
governing documents whose interests the corporation seeks to further; harm to 
those stakeholders should be seen a failure to further a public interest.  We can 
identify other parties harmed by greenwashing: shareholders who believe they 
are investing in a socially and environmentally supportive corporation; 
taxpayers and municipalities whose funds are being surreptitiously directed to 
the greenwasher; competing benefit corporations competitively disadvantaged 
by not greenwashing; and others.  The purpose of the benefit corporation 
legislation risks being undermined if the form is adopted only as a marketing 
ploy. 
Even if it can be determined that behavior harms the public interest, the 
attorney then has to consider whether those actions are a “violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be 
imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to 
the organization.”310  For example, take the case of a difficult labor negotiation 
for Green Corp.  Corporate management may prefer a deal that pays its workers 
lower wages or that cuts more jobs than another option.  In looking at the two 
options in isolation, it may appear clear that management chose the less 
beneficial outcome based on its statement of purpose—creating jobs in local and 
underserved communities.  But, management could reasonably argue that it 
chose the option it did because it felt that the other option would put the company 
in such a fiscally and competitively disadvantaged position that the higher-
paying jobs would be jeopardized entirely.  Is the attorney to make the decision 
that this decision was harmful to the public interest?  Situations like these muddy 
the water on both the goals and possibilities of benefit corporation legislation; 
any whistleblower-type activity should focus on the corporate decision-making 
process rather than the outcomes of those decisions. 
As described in Section III.C above, greenwashing claims brought as benefit 
enforcement proceedings can be based in process—failure to abide by the 
requirements of the Model Legislation and consider stakeholder interests—or in 
outcome—failure to create a general or specific public benefit.  Failures of 
process should be easier for lawyers to identify than failures of outcome.  For 
one, though outcomes are measured against third-party standards, it may be hard 
for the attorney to determine whether a standard is truly met or how a benefit 
corporation is affecting a particular stakeholder or set of stakeholders.  This is 
particularly true when a benefit corporation has stated more than one specific 
public benefit.  Suppose that Green Corp. cancels a contract with a heavily 
polluting plant that happens to employ members of the community.  Green Corp. 
is acting to lower its environmental footprint, but in doing so goes against its 
purpose to create jobs.  Should the lawyer consider this a violation of its 
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purpose?  The Model Legislation provides little guidance on these questions.  
Failures of process, however, may be easier to identify.  In the above example 
of the labor negotiations, the attorney should ask whether Green Corp.’s 
management and directors considered the effects of a new labor contract on 
employment in the local community rather than the outcome.  In both examples, 
if the attorney knows that Green Corp.’s management and directors are not 
reporting their effects on employment, or failing to consider the employment 
effects of their decision, the attorney’s reporting obligations may be triggered. 
It is possible, however, that a benefit corporation may comply with the 
procedural requirements of the Model Legislation in a pro forma manner only.311  
By hewing to the form of the benefit corporation without following the spirit of 
the benefit corporation statutes described in Section III.A above, greenwashing 
is analogous to Simon’s “Agribusiness Welfare” example.312  “Agribusiness 
Welfare” involves an agricultural company that divides its assets into a number 
of smaller entities in order to take advantage of government subsidies intended 
to benefit small farm owners.313  Each farm is the maximum size permitted to 
receive funding under the federal program, though all farms are ultimately 
owned by the same person.314  This division is clearly within the bounds of the 
law, yet at odds with the intent of the statute’s drafters.  This is similar to a 
benefit corporation complying with the pro forma reporting requirements but 
otherwise failing to further its public benefit.  Under this sort of compliance, 
Green Corp. would report that it had considered the interests of its employees 
and the community without having truly internalized processes or making 
decisions for their benefit. 
Some schools of thought hold that there is no problem for the lawyer 
structuring this transaction; the government will notice the defect in the program 
and make the appropriate fix.315 The lawyer’s decision whether to advise the 
client hinges on her own personal comfort with the scheme weighed against the 
potential for lost income to the client.  There is no greater ethical imperative for 
the lawyer to caution against this course of action.316  This argument, however, 
rests on the assumption that proper enforcement will lead to a statutory revision 
outlawing the behavior in question.  Should proper enforcement be lacking, the 
benefit corporation attorney should counsel her client to not go forward with 
transactions that fly in the face of a statutory objective that the government is 
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unable or unwilling to enforce.317  The citizen lawyer advises against this 
behavior because it runs counter to the spirit and purpose of the legislation. 
Greenwashing flies in the face of legislation aimed at allowing the corporation 
to pursue a public benefit and may also be counter to investor expectations.318  
So-called “impact investors” explicitly seek out companies that produce some 
public benefit to invest in, often with an expectation of less-than-market-rate 
returns.319  Benefit corporation legislation contains no external enforcement 
mechanism but rather leaves enforcement to public reporting and claims by 
shareholders and other designated third parties.320  Should an attorney come to 
the conclusion that this enforcement is inadequate, how should she proceed? 
The attorney should endeavor to measure the client’s activities against a third-
party standard to demonstrate a violation; even in states like Delaware where no 
third-party standard is required, such a standard would bolster the attorney’s 
defense to having violated her duty of confidentiality.  If a client has designated 
a specific beneficiary in its corporate documents, the failure to benefit that 
beneficiary may be more readily measurable.321  For greenwashing activities 
grounded in process, the attorney should see that weight was given to the benefit 
corporation’s designated stakeholders or the public. 
An attorney for a greenwashing client should not only advise her client against 
engaging in this kind of behavior; she should consider reporting greenwashing 
as provided under the Model Rules.322  Some greenwashing may rise to the level 
of criminal or fraudulent activity, which clearly would trigger attorneys’ 
discretionary reporting obligations under the Model Rules in order to prevent 
the illegal activity.323  Greenwashing can give rise to actions for fraud, violation 
of state and federal fair trade practices laws, and violations of securities laws.324  
If this activity is fraudulent or otherwise unlawful and has not yet occurred, the 
attorney will be protected by Model Rule 1.6 and need not concern herself with 
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limiting disclosure to entities within the circle of confidentiality.325  A Texas 
court, for example, relying on a rule similar to the Model Rule, allowed a lawsuit 
to proceed against Enron’s lawyers for failure to disclose evidence of fraud 
leading up to the scandal because their duty to would-be harmed parties, 
including shareholders, trumped the duty of confidentiality.326  Ethical rules will 
include this kind of activity in determine reporting obligations; the question of 
duties in the event of activities that fall short of criminal activity is in question 
in light of benefit corporation legislation. 
In other situations, the attorney must determine to whom she can or must 
report greenwashing.  Since some shareholders of a benefit corporation are in a 
similar position as that of shareholders in a closely held corporation, they may, 
by virtue of their position, fall within the circle of confidentiality.  Reporting 
greenwashing to these shareholders should not violate the attorney’s duties of 
confidentiality in the way that reporting breaches of fiduciary duties to 
shareholders in a publicly traded or widely held corporation would.  Attorneys 
will have broader leeway when representing benefit corporations to report 
greenwashing up the corporation chain of command all the way to shareholders, 
provided that the attorneys are mindful to report only to those shareholders who 
are explicitly granted a right to control corporate behavior by bringing a benefit 
enforcement proceeding.  Many benefit corporations also have directors and 
officers specifically designated to oversee benefit creation.327  These positions 
should similarly constitute “the higher authority in the organization” and, should 
they fail to act, shareholders with a right to bring benefit enforcement 
proceedings would make up the highest level of authority.328 Attorneys who 
report greenwashing should report first to benefit officers and directors and, 
finally, shareholders allowed to bring a benefit-related right of action against the 
corporation and its directors.  Under SOX, after going to the highest authorities 
within the corporation (the board and shareholders), the attorney would have the 
discretion to report greenwashing to the SEC.329 
C.  Scope of Advice 
When representing a benefit corporation, the “moral, economic, social and 
political factors” that Model Rule 2.1 leaves to attorneys’ discretion are integral 
to an attorney’s advice.330  Three factors give rise to attorneys’ obligations to 
advise her benefit corporation client on these issues.  First, as guardians of the 
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public interest in addition to shareholder interests, directors and officers of 
benefit corporations must be informed on how their actions will affect the public 
in the same way that directors and officers must know how corporate action 
affects shareholders.331  Second, the attorney must inform her client of new legal 
risks that may arise as a result of failing to promote the public good.332  Third, 
the attorney risks being liable to third parties herself if the client engages in 
greenwashing or other nonbeneficial behavior and corporate decision-makers 
are not informed of the full effects of that behavior.333 
As guardians of not just shareholder but also public interest, benefit 
corporation directors and officers must be informed on how their actions will 
affect the public in the same way that corporate directors and officers must know 
how corporate action affects shareholders, and government workers and 
nonprofit executives need to know the effect of their actions on the public and 
their mission, respectively.  Decision-makers simply cannot do their job without 
that information. Attorneys are not the only source of information about these 
issues, nor are they are on price per share in competitive takeover situations.  
That said, officers and directors look to attorneys for guidance on these issues 
nonetheless, and attorneys should expect and be able to dispense this advice. 
Benefit corporations also face potential new legal and business risks on 
account of their commitment to furthering a public benefit.  The greenwashing 
example illustrates this well. Benefit corporations that purport to, but do not 
actually create a public or specific benefit, as required by each corporation’s 
governing documents, face the potential of lawsuits from stakeholders and 
designated third parties.  Social and political issues could give rise to benefit 
enforcement actions.  They could also have potential effects on tax deductibility 
of certain payments334 and municipal and state funding sources.335  Failure to 
further a public benefit also could pose enterprise risk to a client.  Should Green 
Corp. operate in a way that pollutes a nearby river, for example, a benefit 
enforcement proceeding could be brought for failing to lower its environmental 
footprint.  Any government contracts it won on the basis of its benefit 
corporation status could be in jeopardy.  Investors and customers may respond 
negatively, refusing to invest in or purchase products from the company.  This 
is all in addition to any regulatory risk that could arise.  All of these 
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considerations expand the universe of risk on which attorneys are accustomed 
to advising clients. 
With respect to claims brought against directors and benefit corporations 
under authorizing legislation, ensuring that the corporate client has reviewed 
information regarding the benefit to nonshareholder stakeholders, the 
environment, and others assures that directors will help retain the protection of 
the business judgment rule.  Much as the business judgment rule now protects 
directors who adequately inform themselves before making corporate 
decisions,336 a showing that benefit corporation directors looked at the effects of 
a decision on employees, community members, the environment, and others 
should help to keep them within the safe harbor provided by the business 
judgment rule.  This is particularly true when moral, social, economic, political, 
or environmental issues have a direct effect on one of the client corporation’s 
stakeholders.  Even if the result of corporate action is negative on the 
environment or a particular constituency, directors should have a clear record 
that they reviewed information relevant to the effect on those groups to protect 
themselves and their clients.  This is particularly true given the lack of guidance 
about how benefit corporations should prioritize the interests of various 
stakeholders.337 Procedural considerations, therefore, should be a priority for 
attorneys. 
Although benefit enforcement proceedings have yet to materialize and the 
jurisprudence around them is nonexistent, courts are instructed to apply the 
business judgment rule to questions of public benefit.338  Legislatures recognize 
that it is no more possible to legislate beneficial outcomes than it is to legislate 
profitability.339  In the Revlon line of cases, litigants will likely need to make a 
showing that the board of directors either had inadequate information regarding 
public benefit or that they did have such information for two or more potential 
outcomes and purposefully chose an outcome that they knew to be detrimental 
to the public benefit to be successful in their claims.340  The dutiful attorney will 
have counseled her client to review this information before making a decision 
and, by doing so, will have satisfied her pre-decision ethical duties. 
Third, lawyers risk liability to third parties if their clients fail to produce their 
promised benefit.341  Self-preservation will necessitate an expansion of the scope 
of advice that lawyers for benefit corporations give.  Documented evidence of 
advice on broad impacts of corporation action, particularly on key stakeholders, 
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has the potential to create a safe harbor of accepted practices in which attorneys 
can protect themselves from outside claims.  The advice falling within this safe 
harbor is sure to look very similar to the advice left to the lawyer’s discretion 
under the Model Rules.  For a more in-depth discussion of attorney liability, see 
Section IV.D below. 
As stated in Section IV.A, the passage of benefit corporation legislation 
necessitates a return to the citizen lawyer.  The inclusion of moral, social, 
economic, political, and environmental issues within the scope of advice that 
attorneys dispense harkens back to the citizen lawyer.  The interests of others 
will no longer be something distinct from and in competition with the interests 
of her client; benefit corporation legislation requires that client interests and the 
interest of others be fused.342  To advise on these other subjects is not to insert 
the lawyer’s political or moral judgment ahead of that of her client’s.  Rather, 
doing so complies with her obligation under the Model Rules to assess the array 
of legal and, increasingly, business effects of corporate action.343 
Citizen lawyers do not ignore issues of legal risk; rather, they see them as a 
floor. Advising clients on how to comply with those requirements is a baseline 
for good lawyers; attorneys should strive to counsel clients to go above those 
rules and benefit the public.  Citizen lawyers, particularly, do not limit their 
counsel to complying with statutory minimums or mitigating risks alone.344  
These lawyers look to the effect of client activity on various stakeholders, on the 
public, and on the legal system in which they operate and advise their clients 
thusly.345  In Section V below, I suggest an amendment to the Model Legislation 
that should bring attorney behavior in line with this expectation of ethical 
lawyering. 
D.  Attorney Liability 
Again, attorneys can be found liable to a client’s shareholders under two 
theories: aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.346  To 
bring a successful aiding and abetting claim, would-be plaintiffs will need to 
show that a fiduciary relationship existed.347  Shareholders could bring a claim 
against a greenwashing benefit corporation on the theory that failure to promote 
a public benefit contradicts a consideration under which the shareholders 
purchased shares.  Under such a theory, greenwashing would need to so grossly 
controvert the benefit that the shareholder intended as to overcome the business 
judgment rule and violate the duty of care.  Benefit corporation legislation does 
not leave enforcement of benefit to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, of course.  
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The statutes (with the notable exception of Delaware) create a new and distinct 
benefit enforcement proceeding.348  And, because those actions may only seek 
injunctive relief, it is unlikely that aiding and abetting liability could attach to 
them; the purpose of the legislation was to provide shareholders with a control 
mechanism rather than a mechanism by which they could extract money from 
the company or its directors. 349  Attorneys representing benefit corporations may 
be liable under a negligence standard to both shareholders and nonshareholder 
third parties if their client corporation engages in greenwashing or otherwise 
fails to promote a public or specific benefit, but probably not under an aiding 
and abetting standard. 
For third parties to bring an aiding and abetting claim against counsel, those 
parties would have to show that corporate fiduciaries owed to them and breached 
a fiduciary duty.350  This may be more than is possible under benefit corporation 
legislation.  Directors must consider the impact of their actions on third parties, 
but nothing in the Model Legislation grants those parties a right to enforce that 
benefit absent a specific delegation of that right.351  The same is true under 
SOX.352  SOX leaves room for “similar material violations” that trigger attorney 
reporting obligations,353 but SOX does not create a private right of action for this 
type of violation.  Absent an underlying violation, there is nothing for the 
attorneys to aid and abet. 
Negligence provides a clearer possibility of attorney liability to third parties 
when representing benefit corporations.  Again, shareholders will rely on a 
variety of statements and documents when investing in a client company.  In the 
case of a benefit corporation, many investors will look to governing documents, 
impact-related reports and disclosures, and perhaps the fact that the company is 
incorporated as a benefit corporation when making an investment. Lawyers will 
doubtlessly be involved in both the creation of these documents and the 
evaluation of the company’s impact.  Third parties like customers, vendors, 
employees, and others may also rely on that information when entering into 
transactions with benefit corporations.  These third parties could be seen as the 
party whom the benefit corporation “intends as one of the primary objectives of 
the representation that the lawyer’s services benefit[,]”354 particularly if that 
party is named in the client’s governing documents or impact reporting. 
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Litigation that followed the savings and loans scandals of the 1980s hints at 
how nonshareholder stakeholders could hold attorneys liable for harmful 
activities of benefit corporation clients.  In those cases, receivers and bankruptcy 
trustees sued debtors’ attorneys following the collapse of the savings and loan 
institutions alleging, among other things, professional negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty for behavior that primarily 
harmed creditors.355  In these cases, creditors harmed by corporate action sued 
lawyers alleging that the lawyers breached their duty to their client 
corporation.356  In allowing claims against the attorneys to go forward on the 
basis of the lawyers having violated a duty to the corporation,357 courts implied 
that creditors ought to be included in the group to whom the attorney owes a 
duty.  The courts allowed these claims even though the acts in question were 
approved by management and intended to benefit shareholders.358  Observers 
noted that this suggested, though did not outright hold, that the corporation has 
some duty to creditors in situations approaching bankruptcy and that lawyers are 
required to act in the best interests of those creditors in those situations.359  
Extending this logic to benefit corporations, lawyers should have a similar duty 
vis-à-vis nonshareholder constituents, and attorneys may be liable to those 
constituents for harm caused them by corporate action. 
V. SUGGESTED REFORMS 
I have attempted to interpret lawyers’ ethical obligations flowing from the 
Model Legislation, but it is likely that attorneys’ obligations when representing 
benefit corporations will remain unclear.  This is a common complaint of non-
litigators operating under rules designed for litigation.360  This will be doubly 
true here, given that ethical rules and malpractice law developed out of a private 
law-ordering understanding of corporate law.  Greenwashing is an especially 
difficult situation for the reasons discussed above.  This Article, therefore, 
suggests reforms that seek to clarify attorneys’ ethical duties in these situations.  
First, this Article recommends expanding the scope of advice that attorneys must 
give their benefit corporation clients to include the social, political, 
environmental, and other effects of corporate action on the corporation’s many 
stakeholders and the public at large.  Second, this Article proposes reporting 
obligations for attorneys who become aware that their benefit corporation clients 
are engaging in behavior that negatively affects nonshareholder stakeholders or 
committing greenwashing. 
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These reforms have the added benefit of bolstering benefit corporation 
legislation.  The government may deputize attorneys in the effort to create public 
good through these entities and guard against greenwashing.361  Unlike nonprofit 
and tax-exempt organizations, government agencies like state attorneys general 
and the IRS do not normally have a direct role in enforcing public benefit and 
guiding against greenwashing.  The Model Legislation purposely grants that 
responsibility to shareholders; placing attorneys in that enforcement scheme 
would not run counter to the goals of the legislation or create conflict between 
private and public enforcement. 
These reforms also hold potential benefits for lawyers.  They should serve to 
clarify standards of care, helping lawyers avoid liability, and give attorneys tools 
to increase their value for social entrepreneurs and benefit corporation clients.  
Rules of professional conduct do not necessarily create standards of care when 
determining liability, leaving confusion for courts and attorneys attempting to 
decipher lawyers’ obligations.  Clarifications such as these can help to resolve 
that confusion.362  These standards should also make lawyers more marketable 
to business clients who are serious about pursuing the public benefit set forth in 
their organization’s governing documents.  Business clients already expect 
lawyers to guide them through complex regulatory apparatuses and lower 
transactions costs when guiding clients in various transactions.363  As a result, 
lawyers already play an outsized role in structuring transactions for business 
clients.364  When benefit corporations enter into transactions, their governing 
law will require that they look to create a public benefit through their dealings 
or be mindful that stakeholders and the environment are not harmed.365  Since 
lawyers are already deeply involved in the structuring of business deals, lawyers 
who can show they are able to advise clients on mission in addition to the work 
they traditionally do will be very desirable to the client.  By embedding those 
duties in legislation and ethical codes, prospective clients will be able to 
anticipate that lawyers are already in the business of dispensing advice on 
mission and public benefit. 
Any reform poses the question of which authority is best suited to make the 
reform.  For attorneys representing benefit corporations, two options are state 
bar associations that promulgate rules of professional conduct and state 
legislatures or state agencies that oversee the registration and regulation of 
corporate entities. 
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Bar associations promulgate rules of professional ethics and issue opinions 
and other statements interpreting and applying those rules.366  As self-regulating 
bodies, bar associations may have different priorities than legislatures and 
therefore different reasons for changing rules.  The relationship between rules 
of professional conduct and attorney liability is a complicated one, as violations 
of rules do not always give rise to liability and behavior that complies with the 
rules could still be negligent.  Bar associations may attempt to clarify their 
member’s obligations but are not in a position to create practices and procedures 
that, if followed, will completely exonerate their members from any liability.  
Their motivations for changing rules, however, differ from the motivations of 
legislatures passing benefit corporation legislation. 
State legislatures or regulatory agencies exercising rule-making authority are 
better positioned to adopt these suggestions.  Legislatures already passed benefit 
corporation legislation and delegated certain authority under that legislation to 
state agencies.367  Legislatures could make determinations about how and why 
attorneys should work to create public good and, along with relevant agencies, 
how attorneys should be marshaled in service of that goal.  As discussed, the 
IRS368 and SEC,369 for example, already have rules that apply specifically to 
attorneys practicing before them or representing companies governed by their 
regulations that add additional obligations to those contained in state rules of 
professional responsibility.  These rules would also create a clear legal standard 
of care, a violation of which may create a basis for a negligence per se claim 
against attorneys.370  Doing so may help attorneys avoid liability by granting 
them the chance to show that they complied with their statutory obligations.  
Finally, by adding these suggestions to the laws and regulations governing 
benefit corporations in a given state, these obligations would become part of the 
system into which founders and investor opt.  This avoids complicated questions 
of extra-jurisdictional application: might clients choose lawyers based on the 
rules governing their practice rather than the law governing the entity? 
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A.  Scope of Advice 
Benefit corporation legislation will also affect the scope of advice that 
attorneys give benefit corporation clients, though this too would benefit from 
clarity.  While many attorneys advise clients on enterprise risk and soft legal 
norms,371 that advice still focuses primarily on risk to the client rather than on 
the rights of third parties.  Lawyering to a benefit corporation, however, should 
require that attorneys place the effects of their clients’ behavior on 
nonshareholder stakeholders foremost when giving counsel.  To facilitate this, 
states should clarify that attorneys representing benefit corporations must advise 
corporations on the social, political, environmental, and other impacts of 
corporate action on the corporation’s many stakeholders and the public at large.  
The following language should be added to the Model Legislation: 
Benefit Corporations shall treat the risk of failing to create a general 
public benefit or specific public benefit, or to consider the effects of 
any action or action upon the parties listed in Section 301(a)(1) of the 
Model Legislation, as a legal compliance issue wherever they 
operate.372 
The United Nations did something similar when they approved the Guiding 
Principles in 2011.373  Following the enactment of the Guiding Principles, the 
American Bar Association affirmed that advising clients on human rights norms 
aligned with the requirement in Model 2.1 to provide candid advice.374  
Accordingly, the effects of corporation action on intended beneficiaries and 
other nonshareholder stakeholders should qualify as “other considerations such 
as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the 
client’s situation.”375 As is the case with violations of international human rights 
norms, this change requires that benefit corporations and their attorneys evaluate 
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the effects of corporation action on the same level of other identifiable legal risks 
without first identifying an enforcement mechanism.376 
The IRS has taken the approach of limiting the scope of advice that attorneys 
may give when dispensing written legal advice.377  For example, 31 C.F.R. § 
10.37 states that attorneys may not “take into account the possibility that a tax 
return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit” in written 
advice.378  This accomplishes similar ends to what I propose.  One, it ensures 
that the IRS’s capacity to bring an enforcement claim is not the sole determinant 
of whether individuals and entities comply with (or attempt to comply with) tax 
law.  Second, it requires lawyers to evaluate client behavior in a way that is 
distinct from legal risk alone but rather focuses on the effects and legality of 
client actions.  That said, applying to written advice only leaves space for 
attorneys to orally advise of the odds of enforcement.  Altering the scope of 
advice that attorneys may give is therefore not an entirely novel concept, and 
states should look to this approach to strengthen and clarify their benefit 
corporation laws. 
B.  Reporting 
Second, states should create a reporting requirement and process for attorneys 
who are aware that their benefit corporation clients are failing to promote a 
public benefit.  This proposal attempts to close the gap between discretionary 
and ambiguous obligations found in the Model Rules to report violations of law 
and obligatory requirements under SOX to report “similar violations” to 
violations of fiduciary obligations.379  Under this proposal, the same sort of 
activities that give rise to benefit enforcement proceedings under the Model 
Legislation will give rise to lawyers’ reporting duties. 
This proposal draws heavily from the rules promulgated by the SEC under 
SOX.  Should the attorney “become aware of” a triggering activity by a client 
constituent, she is first to report to the benefit officer, should one exist.380  If that 
person fails to act, she then goes to the benefit director, the board of directors, 
and ultimately shareholders or other parties granted a right to bring benefit 
enforcement proceedings against the company.  Unlike SOX, she does not have 
the option to report to the state agency, as the state agencies have few 
enforcement powers over the benefit corporation.381  Her final resort in the face 
of inaction by her client’s officers and directors is to resign from the 
representation. 
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This formulation presents several positive aspects for both attorneys and 
backers of the benefit corporation movement.  First, the obligations are clear, or 
as clear as they can be under this new scheme.  The standards for “become aware 
of” are hotly debated,382 but this language at least tracks with SOX language, 
allowing ample opportunity for courts to give definition to this term.  Second, 
while it is not yet clear what kind of behavior will be found to violate benefit 
corporation legislation, rules around reporting can develop in tandem with 
benefit enforcement proceedings as they are brought and adjudicated. 
Reporting to third-party beneficiaries, as proposed here under limited 
circumstances, has not been widely recognized.383  For that reason, the proposed 
rule will state that the attorney may disclose only upon making a good faith 
determination that disclosing a triggering behavior to third parties is in the 
interest of the client corporation and that the third party is granted a right to sue 
or other control right. 
C.  General Considerations 
As with proposed SOX rules and the amendments to the Model Rules384 that 
followed the Enron scandal, any proposed change to attorneys’ ethical duties is 
sure to encounter pushback.  It is likely in this case that pushback would focus 
not only on the effect of changes on the attorney’s relationship with her client 
but also on the nature of benefit corporations themselves. Many feel that the 
protections for directors in the Model Legislation are not required because 
corporate law does not actually expose directors and officers to liability should 
they consider the effects of corporate action on nonshareholder stakeholders.385  
If benefit corporations do not actually change corporate law in any meaningful 
way, it should follow that attorneys’ professional responsibility obligations 
should not change either.  That said, even if traditional corporations are not 
precluded from pursuing a mission if doing so comes at the expense of profit to 
the shareholders, are lawyers’ duties totally unaffected?  The attorney must still 
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trust owes a duty to notify beneficiaries of certain issues.  Id. 
An attorney for an estate, guardianship, or trust does not have an attorney-client 
relationship with the beneficiaries of the estate or trust or the ward of the guardianship, 
but shall owe a duty to notify such beneficiaries or ward of activities of the fiduciary 
actually known by the attorney to be illegal that threaten the security of the assets under 
administration or the interests of the beneficiaries. 
Id. 
 384. Cramton et al., supra note 21, at 727–33. 
 385. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable 
Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 659 (2013) (disputing the benefit 
corporation’s ability to promote the idea of corporate social responsibility, alleging its structure 
creates a false dichotomy between benefit corporations and business corporations and is practically 
unworkable); see generally Callison, supra note 261, at 105 (claiming the benefit corporation form 
is based on a flawed premise of shareholder primacy). 
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understand the law governing the client’s organization and how to ascertain the 
identity of the client’s duly authorized constituents.  That analysis will surely be 
affected by the client’s stated legal purpose, and the exercise undertaken in 
Section IV will be valuable. 
These reforms may also disincentive some founders from opting into the 
benefit corporation form.  Even without the suggested rules, an interpretation of 
lawyerly obligations that has lawyers serving the public interest over individual 
constituents and reporting failure to create a public benefit could be unappealing 
for founders who are accustomed to having both freedom to run a business and 
access to trusted counsel.  What manager would want to work in an environment 
where the attorney is more watchdog than counselor?  After all, companies can 
seek third-party certifications or take other steps to signal to the market and 
investors that they are pursuing a mission alongside to profit. 
In important ways, these arguments miss the purpose of the benefit 
corporation form. Benefit corporations were not created to replace traditional 
corporations; they were created to provide an option for founders and investors 
that is somewhere between the traditional charity and for-profit models.386  From 
that vantage point, benefit corporations are less corporations with additional 
requirements than organizations that can pursue a mission without the 
limitations of nonprofit and tax-exempt entities.  Founders and investors 
concerned with mission are actively seeking out ways to combine for-profit 
flexibility with the mission-driven work of charity.387  The duties and suggested 
reforms described herein should appeal to rather than repel those individuals; 
they commit to the benefit corporation’s purpose and help create a predictable 
monitoring and enforcement environment.  Serious social entrepreneurs who 
want to use the benefit corporation to create a public benefit will look to lawyers 
to structure businesses and transactions in a way that furthers their mission.  
Embedding those obligations in lawyers’ ethical duties helps attorneys create 
value for those clients. 
Finally, should these requirements result in pro forma compliance with the 
authorizing legislation, the citizen lawyer’s task is to exercise her rights as a 
citizen to speak out against this kind of behavior and advocate for changes to the 
legislation.  When representing a client whose purpose is to further the public, it 
may be that no constituent is willing or able to comply with this mandate.  The 
lawyer need not whistleblow on her client if she does not deem it in the client’s 
best interest, but she is not precluded from working to better the legal regime 
governing her client organization.388 
                                               
 386. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 387. See Plerhoples, supra note 7, 525–26, 542. 
 388. For example, 
The implications of this idea are particularly important for the so-called Washington 
lawyer (wherever he might be) who is hired to represent his client before agencies and 
legislatures contemplating new law.  This may put us on one of the borderlines I do not 
pretend to resolve definitively, yet I think we can get an idea of how to think about these 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If benefit corporations are successful, questions will arise about the nature of 
corporate law itself and of the role of the legal profession.  Attorneys’ ethical 
duties flow in part from the law governing organizational clients.  In the case of 
corporate representation, obligations reflect the dominant understanding of 
corporate law.  Many interpretations of ethical rules in the corporate context 
reflect a private law conceptualization of corporate law.  Benefit corporation 
statutes, however, attempt to create a corporate form that embraces corporate 
law as a public ordering mechanism.  Ethical obligations will have to be 
reinterpreted to reflect this change.  To the extent that ethical rules lack clarity, 
or where ethics rules do not work to further the purpose of benefit corporation 
statutes, there is an opportunity for states to reform ethics codes for lawyers 
representing benefit corporations. 
The ethics of representing corporations developed around an acceptance of 
corporate law as a private ordering mechanism that embraces shareholder 
primacy.  On the one hand, the benefit corporation could be seen as an exception 
to the rule that corporate law plays a purely private function in society.  Benefit 
corporations will be those who opt out of this rule and into a public ordering 
scheme.  A generation of attorneys advising these clients will embrace as an 
essential part of their professional obligations dispensing with the sort of advice 
currently reserved to discretion.389  On the other hand, the public purpose 
enshrined in benefit corporation legislation may open the door to viewing 
corporate law generally as a public ordering tool and corporate attorneys, 
therefore, as stewards of the public interest. 
Representing the benefit corporation requires a different kind of lawyering 
than does representing a traditional corporation.  The legal profession will need 
to take steps to embrace the citizen lawyer model for attorneys representing 
benefit corporations.  These proposed reforms aid in that movement, but 
educating lawyers, law students, and clients about these new corporate forms 
and lawyers’ responsibilities thereunder will also be necessary for these 
attorneys to comply with their ethical and legal obligations.390 
                                               
cases too.  To the extent that such representation involves participation in a formal 
proceeding in which laws or regulations are drafted and technical competence is required, 
the task is closer to the traditional task of the lawyer as I have sketched it, and the legal 
friend concept is more appropriate.  To the extent that the representation involves (wholly 
lawful) deployment of political pressures, inducements, and considerations, it is closer 
to being political action, and thus to requiring the kind of overriding concern for the 
common good that should motivate all political actors.  Certainly it is absurd that a man 
should seek to be insulated from moral judgment of his accomplishments as a political 
string-puller or publicist by the defense that he was only doing it for money. 
Fried, supra note 64, at 1087 n.39. 
 389. And may indeed be forced to. 
 390. The Shift Project, for example, trains businesses on implementing the Guiding Principles 
into their operations.  Shift is the Leading Center of Expertise on the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights., SHIFT, https://www.shiftproject.org/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
